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“‘[I]t takes a village’ to send someone to prison.”1 
Every pretrial detainee is presumed innocent. Despite this 
presumption, an individual accused of a crime may be detained prior 
to trial. If the accused is subsequently acquitted or the charges against 
her are dropped during her pretrial detention, then she has no recourse 
against the government for the time and liberty of which she was 
deprived. Without any hard consequences for unnecessarily 
incarcerating the accused, our criminal legal system operates without 
any meaningful checks at the pretrial stage.  
One potentially powerful check would be monetary pretrial 
compensation. Unfortunately, pretrial compensation for unnecessary 
incarceration has not gained much traction in the United States for a 
number of deeply ingrained institutional reasons. This Article critically 
analyzes those reasons and sets forth a path forward to make pretrial 
compensation a reality.  
INTRODUCTION 
magine someone is charged with a serious crime, and a judge must 
decide whether to release her before trial. That individual is 
presumed innocent, but her alleged behavior is worrying and 
dangerous. If the judge releases the individual and she goes on to 
commit more crimes while awaiting trial, then the public will cry out 
and complain that the individual should have been jailed. On the other 
hand, if the judge jails the individual pretrial and all the charges are 
1 Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 181 (2019). 
I 
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later dropped, then many may view the time she spent in jail as utterly 
unnecessary.  
Prescriptively drawing a line between necessary and unnecessary 
pretrial incarceration is an incredibly difficult, perhaps impossible, 
task. The difficulty of such a task lies in the unknown, as a judge’s 
decision to detain the accused is, at bottom, a preliminary and 
conjectural assessment of dangerousness.2 The underlying fear of 
putting a dangerous person back on the street is a fundamentally human 
one that judges cannot escape.3 Therefore, absent a rigorous factual 
inquiry that is characteristic of a trial, a pretrial detention hearing 
typically functions as a crude sorting mechanism that unnecessarily 
imprisons people. 
There is no magic solution to this problem. In the past few years, 
reinvigorated consciousness about the pernicious effects of money bail 
has led to a wave of bail reform litigation4 and legislation.5 Although 
they are still in progress, reform efforts have motivated states to 
reevaluate arbitrary and unaffordable money bail practices. As a result, 
some states have scrapped money bail altogether or so circumscribed 
its use as to defang it of its worst aspects.6 But a completely unintended 
result has occurred. As more states are turning to the law by 
implementing preventive detention statutes, release is becoming less 
common.7 For instance, in Baltimore, 23% of individuals presented for 
2 See David Cole, The Difference Prevention Makes: Regulating Preventive Justice, 9 
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 501, 505 (2015) (“[H]owever difficult it may be under some circumstances 
to determine who did what in the past, it is not just difficult, but impossible, to predict with 
anything like an equivalent degree of certainty what an individual will do in the future, at 
least where free will is involved.”). 
3 Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2221 (2019). 
4 E.g., Caliste v. Cantrell, 937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 2019); Dixon v. City of St. Louis, No. 
4:19-cv-0112-AGF, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97327 (E.D. Mo. June 11, 2019); Daves v. 
Dallas County, 341 F. Supp. 3d 688 (N.D. Tex. 2018); Edwards v. Cofield, No. 3:17-CV-
321-WKW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80693 (M.D. Ala. May 18, 2017); O’Donnell v. Harris
County, No. H-16-1414, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115786 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2016); Walker
v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-170-HLM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12306 (N.D. Ga. Jan.
28, 2016); In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (2018); Complaint, Parga v. Tulsa County,
No. 18-cv-00298 (N.D. Okla. June 8, 2018); Complaint, Shultz v. State of Alabama, No.
5:17-cv-00270-MHH (N.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2017); Complaint, Little v. Commissioner, No.
6:17-cv-724 (W.D. La. June 5, 2017); Complaint, Robinson v. Martin, No. 2016 CH 13587
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016).
5 SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK 181–83 (2018) (summarizing the 
states undergoing bail reform as of 2018). 
6 Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky, and Oregon eliminated their money bail schemes and 
replaced the system with nonmonetary-based pretrial release services. Id. at 181 n.158. 
7 In August 2018, the ACLU of Southern California withdrew support in what was 
intended to be a reformatory bill to eliminate money bail in California. After amendments, 
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a bail hearing were held without bail in 2014.8 In 2017, money bail was 
effectively abolished in Maryland, and the percentage of individuals 
detained without bail skyrocketed to 52%.9 
Many other well-intentioned solutions have been proposed or 
implemented to varying degrees, including risk assessment tools and 
nets of eligibility, to reduce the rate of pretrial incarceration.10 But 
many of these reformative responses do little to connect the dots 
between coercive pretrial practices and trial outcomes. As a result, the 
public discourse on bail remains superficial, in that it fails to 
sufficiently engage with and understand the impact bail reform has on 
the criminal legal system as a whole.11  
The incompleteness of the public discourse has academic parallels. 
Although the past year has seen a welcome increase in bail 
the bill instead replaced the existing money bail scheme with a new preventive detention 
scheme. See Press Release, ACLU of S. California, ACLU of California Changes Position 
to Oppose Bail Reform Legislation (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press- 
releases/aclu-california-changes-position-oppose-bail-reform-legislation [https://perma.cc/ 
W38Z-KDB4] (“After further serious consideration, the ACLU of California has changed 
its position on the recently-amended SB 10 to oppose. As much as we would welcome an 
end to the predatory lending practices of the for-profit bail industry, SB 10 cannot promise 
a system with a substantial reduction in pretrial detention. Neither can SB 10 provide 
sufficient due process nor adequately protect against racial biases and disparities that 
permeate our justice system.”). 
8 Colin Starger, Baltimore City Pretrial Release Outcomes, COLINSTARGER DOT 
WEBSITE, http://colinstarger.website/ [https://perma.cc/25DW-TB4U] (follow “MD Pretrial 
Justice” hyperlink; then follow “City Pretrial Outcomes” hyperlink; then select “BALR” in 
the “Hearing” drop-down menu, “1/1/2014” in the “Begin Date” drop-down menu, and 
“12/31/2014” in the “End Date” drop-down menu; then select “Get Results”). 
9 Id. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 Over the past several years, scholarship on bail has grown, but it has primarily focused 
on the effects of money bail. E.g., Christine S. Scott-Hayward & Sarah Ottone, Punishing 
Poverty: California’s Unconstitutional Bail System, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 167, 168 
(2018) (“[A]rgu[ing] that [money] bail schedules are unconstitutional because they are used 
presumptively in a way that typically denies defendants the individualized pretrial detention 
determination to which they are entitled.”); Colin Starger & Michael Bullock, Legitimacy, 
Authority, and the Right to Affordable Bail, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 589 (2018) 
(analyzing the “wall of authority” supporting the doctrinal right to affordable money bail); 
Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2017) 
(proposing a “broad conceptual framework for how policymakers can design a better bail 
system by weighing both the costs and benefits of pre-trial detention” as applied to the 
practice of money bail); Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of 
Federal Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2018) (“If risk assessments [in the 
context of money bail] are paired with adequate safeguards, sustained reductions in 
incarceration and progress toward equal treatment may be possible.”). 
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scholarship,12 it has focused primarily on the particular evils of money 
bail and access to justice based on one’s ability to pay, and it has 
overlooked the problem of outright pretrial detention.13 This Article 
challenges legal scholars to look at pretrial detention as more than a 
“pretrial” problem and to see it as a symptom of larger systemic issues 
that require a broad-based response. Pretrial detention is, by nature, not 
a problem that can be fixed at the margins. It needs to be struck at its 
heart to be felled.  
As a broad-based solution designed for maximum and immediate 
impact, I propose that states should be required to pay monetary 
compensation to an individual who suffers from time lost as a result of 
a pretrial detention determination that does not end with a conviction. 
This proposal may sound radical at first blush, but the idea of pretrial 
compensation is not far-fetched. In fact, our criminal legal system 
already provides for another form of compensation for time lost during 
pretrial detention—the amount of time a defendant spends in pretrial 
detention is credited toward their sentence.14 This is known 
colloquially as “time served.” 
Crediting time served is a nearly universally accepted practice.15 
Indeed, this seemingly simple concept is the beating heart of the 
criminal legal system. For example, time served credits provide an 
effective platform for negotiating plea deals, particularly with 
individuals incarcerated pretrial.16 Time served credits incentivize 
12 Based on the author’s survey of articles contained on WestLaw, in the past year, there 
were sixty law review and journal articles published on bail-related issues. 
13 E.g., Shaila Dewan, Court by Court, Lawyers Fight Policies That Fall Heavily on the 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/us/court-by-court-
lawyers-fight-practices-that-punish-the-poor.html [https://perma.cc/TDN3-G44T]; Kamala 
D. Harris & Rand Paul, Opinion, Kamala Harris and Rand Paul: To Shrink Jails, Let’s
Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/opinion/
kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html [https://perma.cc/RH4E-Y72Z]; Katie
Lannan, A Broad Push for Pretrial Justice Reforms from the States, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 8,
2017).
14 The term “time served credits” refers to the number of days an individual is 
determined to have spent incarcerated prior to trial. If convicted, the individual’s sentence 
is then reduced by the number of days he spent in pretrial detention. Time served credits can 
therefore be considered another form of compensation for those who lose time in jail prior 
to a conviction. I acknowledge that the form of compensation—actual money versus a 
shorter sentence—is fundamentally different, nonetheless this principle analogy is the focus. 
15 See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 
106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 487 (2016) (examining the mediator-like role that 
prosecutors play in the criminal legal system and the resultant flexibility they benefit from 
in order to secure convictions, including the use of plea bargaining). 
16 Id. 
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defendants to accept pleas as a way to negotiate down from the 
maximum penalty.17 As such, without the option of credits, prosecutors 
would lose a valuable and time-tested bargaining chip for plea 
negotiations. Without time served credits, more cases might go to trial, 
and defendants would have to wait even longer for their day in court 
than they now do in our already backlogged system.18 Additionally, 
time served credits play a vital role in reducing prison sentences for 
those convicted at trial.19 The list goes on. In short, time served credits 
are critical to the operational functions of the criminal legal system.20 
Interrogating the time served concept raises a fundamental question: 
If our legal system credits the guilty for time incarcerated prior to a 
conviction,21 then why does no analogous form of compensation exist 
for individuals who spend the same amount of time in pretrial detention 
but are never convicted? As a baseline principal, this Article posits that 
it is illogical that the accused’s time in pretrial detention holds value 
only if the accused is convicted. A legally innocent individual should 
be compensated just as well for the time lost prior to release. The likely 
result of this proposal would be more discerning police and pretrial 
practices that could reverse out-of-control carceral trends.22 
17 Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
1303, 1311–13 (2018) (“The core problem is twofold. First, while defendants always want 
to minimize their potential sentences, prosecutors rarely want to maximize them, hoping 
instead to obtain only their preferred sentence, in the most efficient way possible. This 
asymmetry allows prosecutors to trade away ‘extra’ years of incarceration that the defendant 
desperately wants to avoid but that the prosecutor doesn’t particularly value. As for the 
second problem: This free leverage is typically overwhelming, because most criminal codes 
authorize sentences much higher than what a typical prosecutor—or a typical person, for 
that matter—would actually want to see imposed in a given case. Thus, by threatening a 
seriously inflated set of charges and then offering to replace it with the charges that she truly 
desires, the prosecutor is able to control the defendant’s incentive to plead guilty, and with 
it the outcome of any subsequent ‘negotiation.’ In the aggregate, prosecutors so empowered 
can obtain more convictions, with longer sentences, at lower costs—all preconditions for 
mass incarceration.”) (internal citations omitted). 
18 Cf. William Ortman, When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (summarizing the history and eventual normalization of plea bargaining 
as the primary vehicle for obtaining convictions in the criminal legal system). 
19 Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1970 (2005) (“When a detainee is subsequently convicted of an 
offense, the state can set off the sentence against time served and compensate (although 
incompletely) for the burdens of imprisonment before conviction.”). 
20 See sources cited supra notes 15–19. 
21 Scholars have used the phrase “compensation” to describe the process of crediting the 
convicted with the time spent while incarcerated prior to trial. See, e.g., John Martinez, 
Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting Liberty-Property, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
515 (2008). 
22 See infra Part IV. 
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The goal is to return pretrial detention to the narrowly tailored 
and limited practice that it was intended to be at its inception.23 
Unfortunately, today’s reality is that pretrial detention is so common 
that it has become normalized, numbing policy makers to the unfairness 
and ubiquity of unnecessary incarceration.24 States are increasingly 
adopting pretrial detention statutes,25 and the preventive measure has 
been applied far beyond anticipation. For instance, in 2013 the 
Department of Justice conducted a study on pretrial detention in federal 
district courts26 and found that the percentage of defendants detained 
prior to case disposition increased from 59% in 1995 to 76% in 2010.27 
Further, the Prison Policy Institute observed that African Americans 
are five times more likely and Hispanics twice more likely to be 
incarcerated than Caucasian Americans.28 Due to the swift-acting 
nature of preventive justice procedures, both formal and less formal 
checks on pretrial detention are few and far between, resulting in 
increasing carceral trends.  
The title of this Article, Unnecessary Incarceration, coins a phrase 
to define a category of accused individuals who spend a prolonged 
period of time incarcerated prior to trial and who will later be cleared 
23 Pretrial detention is permissible because it falls under the category of preventive 
justice. Preventive justice measures are used when the government permits temporary 
deprivations against an individual’s liberty without many procedural protections. In the case 
of pretrial detention (also called preventive detention), the law permits an individual’s 
detention prior to ascertaining his or her guilt based on clear and convincing evidence that 
he or she is a threat to the community (or another individual) such that the accused could 
not be safely afforded pretrial release. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–52 
(1987). When pretrial detention was federally implemented, Congress placed a substantial 
amount of procedural protections on preventive detention hearings to ensure no erroneous 
deprivations of liberty would occur and that the power to deprive the accused of his liberty 
prior to trial would not be abused. Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, 
ch. 1, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (formerly S. 1762). 
24 See infra note 204. 
25 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., MOVING BEYOND 
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-
Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2YL-76GN]. 
26 THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND 
MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (2013). Although this data reflects trends in 
federal courts, it is nonetheless relevant as an example for a nationwide trend toward 
increased reliance on pretrial detention. 
27 Id. at 3. 
28 LEAH SAKALA, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, BREAKING DOWN MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE 2010 CENSUS: STATE-BY-STATE INCARCERATION RATES BY 
RACE/ETHNICITY (2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [https://perma. 
cc/ME5X-AMYX]. 
614 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 607 
of all charges.29 The word unnecessary should not be taken in the 
colloquial sense to mean “not needed,” as there are likely instances 
where preventive detention is legitimate30 but the government fails to 
secure a conviction. This is by no means a perfect metric to gauge 
unnecessary versus necessary incarceration, but it is sufficient for the 
purposes of this Article to demonstrate the complexity of the problem 
the criminal system is faced with.31 Here, the term unnecessary is also 
meant to broadly encapsulate the inequalities and deficiencies hidden 
in the steps that lead to the preventive detention determination itself, 
which include the arrest as well as the prosecutorial decisions made in 
anticipation of the hearing.32  
This Article builds on my prior work, Displacing Due Process, 
which explained that, because heightened procedural due process 
protections are not applied at their maximum strength during the 
pretrial process, erroneous deprivations of liberty are rampant.33 One 
of the key contributing factors to this dramatic increase in the use of 
pretrial detention is the sheer volume of arrestees.34 This is the 
beginning of the negative feedback loop, where, in order to keep up 
with increasing intake, the system must develop “quick justice” 
techniques to move defendants in and out of the system at a faster 
29 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) (holding that an individual arrested 
without a warrant may be temporarily detained for up to twenty-four hours to ensure the 
timely administrative function of providing the arrestee with a probable cause hearing). 
30 See Cole, supra note 2; see also infra Part III. 
31 The use of the term “unnecessary” to describe this form of incarceration is 
unconventional and imperfect, but I am at a loss to find a word more fitting to describe the 
practice of detaining so many legally innocent individuals en masse. I appreciate the 
argument that not all those who escape their charges are innocent, but I think the more 
concerning issue is whether all those who accept guilty pleas are actually guilty. For a 
discussion on the benefits of overbreadth, see infra Part IV. 
32 See infra Part III. 
33 Zina Makar, Displacing Due Process, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 425 (2018). The present 
Article pushes against the existing bail literature and scholarship that falls short of 
articulating the impact of bail reform on the criminal legal system as a whole. 
34 WENDY SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, MASS 
INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2019 n.2 (2019) (“More recently, we analyzed the 2014 
National Survey of Drug Use and Health . . . from this source, we estimate that 
approximately 6 million unique individuals were arrested and booked into jails in 2014.”), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html [https://perma.cc/HAL7-66U9]. 
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rate.35 The cost of quick justice is the erosion of procedural due process 
protections and skyrocketing rates of pretrial detention.36  
Systemic injustices, although often discussed, are rarely resolved. 
Institutional players are most willing to police injustices when they are 
extreme and involve an easily identifiable bad actor, such as blatant 
acts of police misconduct or obvious abuses of prosecutorial 
privilege.37 Such headline-grabbing occurrences are rare, however, 
and, unfortunately, the everyday injustice of inadequate procedural 
protections goes unnoticed, even as it allows for the incarceration of 
some of our community’s most vulnerable.38 Ultimately, it is the 
system that is to blame.39 This leads to a compounding problem, as 
incarceration can fundamentally destroy the lives of such individuals. 
Beyond the lives it affects directly, unnecessary incarceration harms 
the legitimacy of the criminal legal system.40 
The monetary compensation scheme that I propose in this Article for 
those subjected to unnecessary incarceration provides a dual-purpose 
solution: (1) it provides a meaningful remedy to such individuals for 
their time lost, and (2) it acts as an institutionalized check to reduce 
inaccuracies in the preventive justice system that are a result of the 
system’s inherent procedural defects.  
This Article is organized in the following Parts: 
Part I reviews the existing literature on bail, identifying harms to the 
accused and drawing connections to the problems associated with 
preventive justice on a mass scale for “garden-variety” defendants.41 
This Part explains the magnitude of unnecessary incarceration and how 
that develops into a growing negative feedback loop with few avenues 
of recourse for the legally innocent.  
35 See Jenny Roberts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
779, 801 (2018) (“One facet that is often not discussed, but that is particularly relevant in 
the misdemeanor arena due to the sheer volume of cases in the lower criminal courts, is that 
law enforcement and prosecutors must be more selective about which misdemeanor cases 
they really want in the criminal justice system.”). 
36 See generally Makar, supra note 33. 
37 See, e.g., Azi Paybarah, Why the Central Park Five Matter, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/nyregion/newyorktoday/central-park-5-when 
-they-see-us.html# [https://perma.cc/3ZTF-3LPW].
38 See, e.g., Carols Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining,
59 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (2018) (examining racial disparities in the plea-bargaining process).
39 See generally Makar, supra note 33. 
40 See generally id. 
41 See infra Part I. 
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Part II analyzes the concept of time served as a form of 
compensation that should also be provided to individuals who suffer 
unnecessary pretrial incarceration.42  
Part III explains the multilayered process that turns the legally 
innocent into the unnecessarily incarcerated. This Part shines a light on 
the implicit inequalities in the pretrial scheme that, in their own way, 
compound into one larger system that filters out the more advantaged 
and locks in the most vulnerable.43  
Part IV reviews existing reform efforts, including risk assessment 
tools and nets of eligibility.44 In doing so, this Article observes that 
many baseline reform efforts are low risk and low reward, therefore 
holding little promise of improving the equality disparity in and the 
accuracy of the justice system. This Part goes on to explain the benefits 
of a pretrial compensation scheme and addresses counterarguments.  
I 
DEFINING UNNECESSARY INCARCERATION 
Defining the contours of unnecessary incarceration requires a review 
of the larger discourse of preventive justice measures, which have 
normalized and so ingrained the use of pretrial detention in our legal 
system. This Part further reviews the limitations for relief available to 
those detained prior to trial and uncovers a spectrum of losses—both 
foreseeable and unintended—created by incarcerating the legally 
innocent.  
A. Preventive Detention Normalized
Preventive justice measures are predictive, formalized processes that 
often act against an individual or group.45 The measures create a 
constraint against a person’s liberty when normal state action is not 
effective.46 As a result, preventive measures employ a lower threshold 
42 See infra Part II. 
43 See infra Part III. 
44 See infra Part IV. 
45 Pretrial detention, also referred to as preventive detention, is one such preventive 
justice measure that this Article focuses on. E.g., David Cole, Out of the Shadows: 
Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 695 (2009) 
(“In reality . . . preventive detention is already an integral feature of the American legal 
landscape.”); Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 56, 56 (2004) (“[P]ure preventive detention is more common than we 
usually assume, but . . . this practice violates fundamental assumptions concerning liberty 
under the American constitutional regime.”). 
46 See Cole, supra note 2, at 5. 
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of procedural due process protections.47 Effectively, formalized 
preventive justice procedures act as a gap-filling mechanism when the 
government cannot act swiftly enough to prevent what it believes to be 
an articulable threat.48 Because it is expected that procedural 
safeguards will protect the individual later, a temporary deprivation is 
permitted now.49 Preventive justice measures, which balance an 
individual’s right to liberty and the government’s need to protect 
against immediate threats, are considered constitutional in many 
contexts, including common criminal proceedings.50 These measures 
are widely accepted because they protect the community from viable 
threats in the absence of more permanent and timely state action.51  
Formal preventive justice refers to procedures that have been 
institutionally implemented, either via exigent emergency 
circumstances,52 through legislation,53 or Supreme Court validation.54 
47 See id. at 6. 
48 See id. 
49 Similar in concept to the idea of preventive justice, the theory set forth in Displacing 
Due Process argues that procedural protections are wrongly displaced, specifically at the 
pretrial stage, because of the false assumption that any wrongs that occurred in the pretrial 
phase will be corrected through the enhanced procedural protections afforded at trial. The 
resultant effect is referred to as prospective procedural displacement. Problems associated 
with prospective procedural displacement—preventive justice gone unchecked—are 
discussed in depth in Displacing Due Process. Makar, supra note 33. 
50 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 764–52 (1987) (holding that the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984, which allows a judicial officer to detain a suspect upon a finding of clear and 
convincing evidence that the accused poses a flight risk or is a likely future danger to the 
community, is not facially unconstitutional); see also infra Section II.A and accompanying 
notes 138–39, 141–43 (summarizing Salerno). 
51 See Cole, supra note 2. 
52 See id. at 6; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[L]egal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately 
suspect . . . . Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such 
restrictions . . . .”). The decision in Korematsu was only recently overruled by the Court in 
Trump v. Hawaii. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
53 E.g., Steven L. Chanenson & Jordan M. Hyatt, The Use of Risk Assessment at 
Sentencing: Implications for Research and Policy, in WORKING PAPER SERIES, VILLANOVA 
UNIVERSITY CHARLES WIDGER SCHOOL OF LAW 6 (2016), https://digitalcommons.law. 
villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1201&context=wps [https://perma.cc/99VE-KCBU] 
(discussing the use of risk assessment tools in sentencing hearings in order to decrease the 
likelihood of recidivism). 
54 The Supreme Court has validated a number of actions that require national security 
initiatives. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (holding that an individual 
arrested without a warrant may be temporarily detained for up to twenty-four hours to ensure 
the timely administrative function of providing the arrestee with a probable cause hearing). 
States have adopted preventive detention measures, such as stop and frisk. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968). The Court has also validated preventive detention in Salerno, 481 
U.S. at 752. 
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One of the first instances of nationwide formal preventive justice was 
that of Japanese internment during World War II.55 Although there 
have been grave criticisms of this approach, hindsight provided an 
opportunity for the political process to reform preventive justice 
procedures.56 Over time, formal preventive justice processes were 
expanded to other areas of the law, rather than just national 
emergencies.57 This includes involuntary civil commitment, the 
detention of juveniles pending trial, and, ultimately, the preventive 
detention of adult defendants charged with “serious crimes.”58 
These measures have the Supreme Court’s stamp of approval, but 
the growing use of preventive justice to regulate garden-variety crime 
raises many constitutional concerns. Professor Frederick Schauer 
argues that preventive justice is ubiquitous in our criminal legal system 
and contends that punitive uses of coercion, like preventive forms of 
coercion, are all probabilistic at their core, specifically noting that both 
forms of coercion share similar ends.59 In other words, Schauer argues 
that there is never a scenario where there will be complete accuracy, 
55 See generally Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214 (holding that an Executive Order mandating 
Japanese Americans to move into relocation camps following the attack on Pearl Harbor fell 
within the war powers of Congress and the Executive). 
56 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, 
has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law under the 
Constitution.’” (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting))). 
57 The use of preventive detention for individuals accused of “serious crimes” was not a 
novel proposition by Congress. Here, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, provided 
a laundry list of instances where the Court has upheld preventive detention: 
We have repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in community 
safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest. 
For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, 
the Government may detain individuals whom the government believes to be 
dangerous. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (approving unreviewable 
executive power to detain enemy aliens in time of war) . . . . Even outside the 
exigencies of war, we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental 
interests can justify detention of dangerous persons. Thus, we have found no 
absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens 
pending deportation proceedings. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537–42 
(1952); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) . . . . If the police suspect 
an individual of a crime, they may arrest and hold him until a neutral magistrate 
determines whether probable cause exists. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
Finally, respondents concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee may 
be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. at 534, or a danger to witnesses. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748–49. 
58 Id. at 745, 749–52; Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
59 FRED SCHAUER, The Ubiquity of Prevention, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 20–21 (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner, & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013). 
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because both preventive measures and punitive schemes contain some 
variant of uncertainty.60 Thus, preventive coercion should not raise 
normative concerns.61 Schauer further contends that the “difference 
lies not in the existence or not of prevention, but rather in differences 
in degree, in differences in the burden of proof, and in differences in 
procedures.”62 But that logic is inherently flawed. If the same 
procedures that are known to be inaccurate were used to detain 
preventively and then later relied upon to punish the accused for crimes 
that he is alleged to have committed, then prevention is doing more 
than its intended goal; instead it is adjudicating guilt.  
What Schauer fails to recognize is that the goal of prevention is 
different from that of punishment. Theoretically, although his 
conclusion may be true, if procedures surrounding preventive measures 
were heightened, decisions would be less error prone, and the issues 
surrounding preventive detention would be nonexistent. But that is not 
the reality of our criminal legal system. Instead, normalization of 
prevention beginning at every level—from arrest to conviction—has 
developed a multilayer system that compounds inequalities, developing 
inaccuracies that are later relied upon as the accused progresses deeper 
into the legal system.63  
Scholar David Cole directly addresses Schauer’s thesis, suggesting 
preventive measures should raise constitutional concerns but also 
noting that there are inevitable limits in the law’s ability to constrict 
them.64 Instead, Cole identifies that “[a] number of informal, practical, 
and ‘soft law’ constraints may in fact do much of the day-to-day work 
in confining the scope of preventive justice.”65 Soft law checks can be 
thought of as informal practices established to promote transparency 
and trust between the community and government. A common example 
of this is council meetings between police officers and community 
leaders to discuss policing objectives and strategies.66 
Although Cole’s analysis elaborates on existing informal 
protections, more are needed. Specifically, it is vital to recognize that 
60 See id. at 15–16. 
61 SCHAUER, supra note 59; see also Cole, supra note 2 (summarizing Schauer’s 
argument). 
62 SCHAUER, supra note 59, at 21. 
63 See infra Part III. 
64 See Cole, supra note 2, at 7–10. 
65 Id. at 20 (identifying “soft law” or informal checks as nonconstitutional or nonlegal 
constraints, including community responses that indicate the legitimacy of the preventive 
measure, resource constraints, and accountability mechanisms). 
66 Id. at 15. 
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pretrial detention is now a formal, fully normalized form of preventive 
justice.67 Thus, it requires a formal, institutionalized deterrent to 
prevent abuse—soft law is not enough.68  
Preventive justice measures that are used only during exigent 
circumstances are different in nature than measures that are formally 
employed and relied upon on a day-to-day basis. In cases of national 
security, the danger to the community could be devastating, and 
assessing the harm of the suspect could require the coordination of 
multiple agencies. Therefore, the swiftest action (and most likely to 
quickly incapacitate the suspect) is readily deployed and not 
questioned.69 For instance, the horrific acts of 9/11 resulted in the U.S. 
government expanding the definition of terrorism “to make it easier to 
prosecute and convict individuals before they succeed in committing 
an actual terrorist act.”70 In the case of garden-variety crimes that are 
likely to occur, the need to deploy a procedural process to assess 
dangerousness should hardly be a surprise. Therefore, mechanisms for 
incapacitation should contain the least onerous restrictions on one’s 
release as well as meaningful avenues of relief to counteract abuses of 
preventive powers.  
Soft law or informal approaches might provide an appropriate check 
where preventive justice is not regularly relied upon as a normalized 
process in everyday criminal proceedings. Yet with the expansion of 
formal preventive justice measures to integral daily proceedings, like 
in bail hearings, the “gap” in the justice system is exploited. To the 
extent that soft law tactics could have been used, the overwhelming 
reliance on preventive measures to move cases forward diminishes the 
effectiveness of soft law tactics.71 
67 John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 
76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 30 (1985) (“The difficulties associated with predictive 
decisions notwithstanding, prediction of future danger is an unavoidable reality in bail: it 
has not only been practiced traditionally by judges at their discretion, but has been 
institutionalized in many of the recent laws.”). 
68 See infra Parts II, IV. 
69 BAUGHMAN, supra note 5, at 130–32 (observing a distinction between bail laws for 
citizens charged with common crimes versus those charged as terror suspects). 
70 Cole, supra note 2. 
71 Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
837, 857–73 (2018) (observing that traditionally, individuals who were charged with 
misdemeanors maintained the right to release, but over time, misdemeanors that include 
lesser offenses, such as vagrancy, were used punitively to control and detain minorities). 
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Preventive detention was certainly conceptualized to include 
limitations.72 In a facial challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the 
Supreme Court upheld its validity, holding that multiple procedural 
protections would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivations of 
liberty.73 These include heightened procedural scrutiny, enhanced 
adversarial hearings, and limitations to the length of detention.74 In 
practice, these limitations are impossible to implement due to the sheer 
magnitude of cases that are processed through the criminal legal 
system.75 The result of this overbroad application of preventive justice 
in daily bail proceedings is that too many people become incarcerated 
prior to trial.76 The number of defendants with disposed cases who 
were detained pretrial increased by 184%, from 27,004 in 1995 to 
76,589 in 2010.77 This includes guilty pleas, trial convictions, 
dismissals, and acquittals.78 In an analysis of felony cases in state court, 
approximately one in every five individuals detained prior to trial had 
their cases dismissed or acquitted79—preventive detention, in many 
cases, is all for naught.80  
Many defendants affected by preventive detention are without a 
meaningful remedy. Because there is no effective check on the use of 
punitive preventive measures early in criminal proceedings, the intent 
of procedural due process protections is unrealized.81 The accused is 
72  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (“[T]he maximum length of 
pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.”); see 
18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012). 
73 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
74 Id. at 746–47, 750. 
75 E.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1043, 1086 (2013) (“Heavy caseloads and bulk processing wear down prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and judges, causing them to lose touch with the individuating principles
that are supposed to govern their respective roles.”); Manns, supra note 19 (identifying that
judges and prosecutors alike “face burgeoning case loads and benefit from the criminal
justice system’s reliance on plea bargaining.”).
76 The American criminal justice system holds almost 2.3 million people in 1,719 state 
prisons, 109 federal prisons, 1,772 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,163 local jails, and 
80 Indian Country jails as well as in military prisons, immigration detention facilities, 
civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and prisons in the U.S. territories. 
SAWYER & WAGNER, supra note 34, at 1. 
77 COHEN, supra note 26, at 1. 
78 Id. 
79 THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRETRIAL 
RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 7 (2007). 
80 See infra Part IV. 
81 See Makar, supra note 33, at 429. 
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also effectively unable to challenge such preventive measures, 
rendering their innocence meaningless.  
The following section addresses the barriers to relief that pretrial 
detainees face.  
B. Barriers to Relief
Opportunities for relief at the bail stage are limited.82 If a defendant 
is incarcerated pretrial for a state crime, she may challenge the legality 
of her detention, either through a bail review proceeding or through a 
state habeas corpus petition.83 Both options can be used during the 
accused’s pretrial incarceration to obtain release (or to lessen the 
restrictions of his current pretrial release conditions). Depending on the 
jurisdiction, these challenges can take a few days, several weeks, or 
longer.84 For individuals detained on misdemeanor charges, these 
options are inconsequential because most misdemeanor cases are 
resolved within thirty to ninety days.85 Because a challenge to pretrial 
detention becomes moot rather quickly, bail reviews or habeas corpus 
petitions are not effective means of redress in misdemeanor cases. 
Instead, such challenges are meaningful avenues of relief only for 
individuals facing felony charges.86 Even if relief is secured in the form 
of release, neither a bail modification nor a habeas petition provides a 
remedy for the accused to recover wages lost or any other monetary 
82 See Pretrial Release Conditions, NCSL (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-release-conditions.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
3DXN-SHQH] [hereinafter Pretrial Release Conditions] (providing a list of laws as of 
2016). 
83 The National Conference of State Legislatures conducted a fifty-state survey of state 
pretrial release laws. As of 2016, nearly all states provided the option of pretrial release to 
the accused. See id. 
84 See Natapoff, supra note 75 (discussing how some defendants charged with 
misdemeanors may remain incarcerated for up to four weeks after arrest); Jenny Roberts, 
Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 
45 U.C.D. L. REV. 277, 280 (2011) (noting that a court date can be up to three weeks after 
arraignment for a misdemeanor). 
85 A study performed in New York City from 2009 to 2013 found that detention rates 
are higher for defendants in felony cases (43%) than defendants in misdemeanor convictions 
(12%). Also, in New York, pretrial detention lengths among detainees included 180 days 
for felony charges and 90 days for misdemeanor charges, as mandated by law. Emily Leslie 
& Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: 
Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON. 529, 536 (2017). 
86 Some jurisdictions treat defendants adversely if they seek relief in the form of release 
while they await trial. See Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The 
Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3599, 3622–23 (2013). 
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damages incurred during pretrial detention. These legal vehicles simply 
address whether or not the individual should be detained.  
If relief is denied, a defendant may apply for leave to appeal the bail 
determination.87 Most states, however, do not provide an absolute right 
to appeal a bail determination because the bail proceedings are only the 
first step in the criminal proceedings.88 Moreover, appellate review 
does little to assist the affected individual who has been destabilized as 
the individual’s underlying criminal case may have already been 
resolved before appellate review is of any real benefit. But individuals 
who are able to use this vehicle should not be discouraged from doing 
so, as such litigation may establish good precedent to help future 
defendants subject to overbroad preventive justice schemes.89  
Other litigation vehicles used to challenge wrongful detention 
include § 1983 claims90 and tort claims for false imprisonment,91 
wrongful arrest, and malicious prosecution.92 These options are not 
87 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-204 (West 2020). 
88 Dorothy Weldon, More Appealing: Reforming Bail Review in State Courts, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 2401, 2419 n.123 (“[A]ppellate review is not constitutionally guaranteed 
. . . .”) (citing Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1221 
(2013)). But see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (“An appeal from a judgment 
of conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independently of constitutional or statutory 
provisions allowing such appeal.”). 
89 See, e.g., Bradds v. Randolph, 194 A.3d 444, 463 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018) 
(accepting the argument that incarceration due solely to the imposition of an unaffordable 
monetary bond is illegal and ordered habeas relief granted based on a showing of inability 
to pay when only one of the three plaintiffs benefited from appellate review as the other two 
petitioners’ underlying criminal cases were resolved prior to the Order and they 
subsequently were released from detention). 
90 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, a pretrial detainee 
may raise an excessive force claim against a jail official. To prove the excessive force claim, 
a pretrial detainee must show that the officers’ use of force was objectively unreasonable. 
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). 
91 See Mark Puente, Baltimore Man Settles for $200,000 in False Arrest Case, BALT. 
SUN (June 20, 2015), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/bs-md-reeping-lawsuit-
20150630-story.html [https://perma.cc/64XM-N5LT]. 
92 Manns, supra note 19 (“A variety of causes of action are available to pretrial detainees 
including § 1983 actions and common law torts for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, and 
malicious prosecution. However, these causes of action may help only a slender percentage 
of detainees because claimants must show that the government lacked probable cause in 
their arrest and detention or engaged in even more egregious misconduct.”) (citing Adele 
Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 73, 86–93 (1999)). A number of cases exist where defendants unsuccessfully 
sued for wrongful detention. One such case is Smith v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 4918, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 601 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2019), aff’d, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151957 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 6, 2019) (reviewing court treated a § 1983 claim against pretrial detention as a 
common law malicious prosecution claim and granted the motion to dismiss because the 
petition was time-barred and the state arguably offers an adequate remedy). 
624 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 607 
likely to provide immediate relief (like a bail modification or habeas 
corpus petition), and often the juice is not worth the squeeze. The 
amount incurred in attorneys’ fees often outweighs the reward a 
defendant receives in monetary compensation.93  
Even in instances of dismissals or acquittals, and regardless of 
whether she spent time incarcerated prior to trial, the defendant suffers 
from the stigma of an arrest on her record.94 Expungement laws, which 
provide individuals who were arrested and charged but not convicted 
of crimes an opportunity to clear their records, are growing more 
common.95 Although expungement may erase evidence of an arrest, it 
does not undo the lasting effects of that arrest and its resultant 
detention.96 Expungement procedures do nothing to prevent the 
overbroad reach of preventive detention schemes.  
In sum, challenges to pretrial detention during one’s confinement 
can be slow and arduous, and they often do not result in any meaningful 
relief. As is, civil actions where defendants seek monetary 
compensation for their time lost are often not fruitful and can create an 
even greater financial burden on the accused. Individuals who seek 
compensatory damages for wrongful pretrial incarceration are limited 
by state immunity laws that protect state actors from liability.97  
93 If a defendant is provided a public defender, the public defender may work only on 
the criminal aspect of the crime per state statute. Any collateral civil issues must be initiated 
by the defendant, whereby he would be required to hire and pay for his own attorney unless 
someone accepted the case pro bono. 
94 Linda S. Buethe, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records: Avoiding the 
Inevitable Social Stigma, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1979) (“Severe disabilities could 
result from disclosure of . . . arrest records even though the arrests did not result in 
convictions. The problem is that only lip service is given to the presumption that a person is 
innocent until proven guilty.”). 
95 Eric Westervelt & Barbara Brosher, Scrubbing the Past to Give Those with a Criminal 
Record a Second Chance, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 19, 2019, 4:58 AM), https://www. 
npr.org/2019/02/19/692322738/scrubbing-the-past-to-give-those-with-a-criminal-record-a-
second-chance [https://perma.cc/W2TH-5Q4B] (“In the last two years [since 2019], more 
than 20 states have expanded or added laws to help people move on from their criminal 
records . . . .”); 50-State Comparison of Relief Mechanisms, RESTORATION OF RIGHTS 
PROJECT, http://restoration.ccresourcecenter.org [https://perma.cc/T9CF-9D74] (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2020). 
96 See Buethe, supra note 94, at 1090; Westervelt & Brosher, supra note 95. 
97 Manns, supra note 19, at 1951 n.15 (“[P]rosecutors are virtually immune from civil 
liability for their charging decisions.”). See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 483 (1991). In 
fact, charging decisions are rarely if ever subjected to judicial scrutiny. See also Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (holding that there is no federal constitutional right to any 
review of prosecutorial charging decisions). 
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Ultimately, barriers to relief exist for pretrial detainees because at 
this stage the criminal proceedings are far from over.98 But often it is 
the punitive-like nature of incarceration that brings the criminal 
proceedings to an end.99 The following section articulates those 
punitive-like effects on pretrial detainees through an analysis of the 
losses pretrial detainees suffer.  
C. The Meaning of Time Lost
Pretrial detention is intended only to protect the public or ensure the 
defendant’s appearance at trial.100 Any other diminishment of rights 
that does not serve either aim is prohibited and may constitute 
punishment.101 Despite this, with relief for pretrial detainees so limited, 
losses can seem limitless.  
The foreseeable immediate consequences of detention include loss 
of job, housing, and educational opportunities.102 These are the day-to-
day losses that, as research has shown, can break the foundation of 
one’s livelihood.103 Over time these losses have become normalized—
emphasizing these losses does little to sway legislators, judges, or other 
institutional players from pursuing pretrial detention.104 But losses 
also include those that are unforeseeable and unintended. This 
predominately includes the loss of constitutional rights.105  
98 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121–22. See generally Makar, supra note 33. 
99 Weldon, supra note 88, at 2424 (“Even short stays in local jails can be traumatizing 
or fatal. The outcome of bail hearings can thus create the ‘Sophie’s choice’ of remaining in 
jail and maintaining innocence, or pleading guilty and returning home with a criminal record 
that ‘follows them for the rest of their lives.’”). 
100 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2018). 
101 Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 n.8 (2017) (affirming Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520 (1979)) (invalidating the proposition arising from Bell v. Wolfish that the 
presumption of innocence does not apply to persons detained prior to trial) (internal citations 
omitted). 
102 See Weldon, supra note 88, at 2424; see also Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream 
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713–14 (2017) 
(“A person detained for even a few days may lose her job, housing, or custody of her 
children.”). 
103 See Heaton et al., supra note 102, at 713. 
104 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (stating that if a judicial officer is 
unable to find a condition of release that will “reasonably assure the appearance of the 
[accused]” and ensure the safety of any person or the community, then Section 3142(e) of 
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires a judicial officer to “order the detention of the person 
prior to trial”). 
105 Any form of incarceration will result in loss, but what is unclear is how much and 
what kind of loss someone who is presumed innocent and incarcerated must endure 
compared to someone who is incarcerated because he has been convicted. 
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1. Foreseeable Losses
Foreseeable losses can include any loss that affects the
incarcerated—convicted or unconvicted—but specifically includes 
losses that society has accepted as the burden an individual must accept 
for endangering the community.106 For instance, someone serving a 
sentence may be unable to make mortgage or rental payments due to 
loss of income.107 Similarly, due to the abrupt nature of pretrial 
detention,108 the accused may not be able to inform her employer of 
her absence or arrange afterschool childcare.109 Particularly for pretrial 
detainees, their immediate community often suffers as a result of 
incarceration, creating an unstable environment for those returning 
from jail to daily life.110 Once released, the accused must return to life 
with the stigma of someone arrested and who society believes has been 
involved in criminal activity.111  
Losses to one’s privacy are also common. Once admitted to a jail or 
prison, detainees lose certain Fourth Amendment protections and are 
subject to invasive searches.112 Although reduced privacy is necessary 
106 Manns, supra note 19, at 1970 (“Society’s interests in preempting violence or 
reducing the risk of flight may be significant enough in many cases to justify the imposition 
of pretrial detention.”). 
107 See id. at 1971–72; Weldon, supra note 88, at 2424. 
108 For instance, there is often no warning because the accused could be arrested without 
a warrant. 
109 Manns, supra note 19, at 1971–72; see also Weldon, supra note 88, at 2424. 
110 See Makar, supra note 33, at 458 (“Particularly because the disparity in bargaining 
power is so skewed, those incarcerated pre-trial often accept plea deals to avoid spending 
time in jail waiting for vindication. . . . They may already be at risk of losing a job or losing 
housing because rent is not paid.”); see also Heaton et al., supra note 102, at 796 (“Consider, 
for instance, the case of Joseph Curry. . . . Curry had discovered in 2012 that there was a 
warrant out for his arrest, accusing him of petty theft at a Walmart he had never entered. 
When he called the Pennsylvania state police to clarify the situation, he was arrested and 
jailed. Bail was set at $20,000, which he could not afford. In the months he was detained 
and waiting for his case to proceed, Curry ‘missed the birth of his only child, lost his job, 
and feared losing his home and vehicle. Ultimately, he pled nolo contendere in order to 
return home.’”) (quoting Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2016)). 
111 See, e.g., Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 1025 (2019) (“[T]he 
defendant is seen as being in fact an offender, who awaits only the formal verdict of the 
court before receiving the punishment he deserves.”) (quoting R.A. Duff, Pre-Trial 
Detention and the Presumption of Innocence, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 120, (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 2013)) (“[T]hat is why it is so easy (and 
so revealing) to slide into talking about the danger that the defendant will commit, not 
‘offenses,’ but ‘further offenses’ while on bail.”). 
112 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 323, 339 (2012) (holding 
jail officials did not violate petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy by subjecting 
petitioner to a strip search, including the lifting of genitals, before allowing petitioner to 
return to general population). The Court in Florence further noted that “[p]eople detained 
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for the safety of correctional staff and other inmates, those who are 
ultimately never convicted of a crime can find these searches even more 
demoralizing.113  
Not surprisingly, these losses (loss of wages, housing, invasions of 
privacy, etc.) are common to all individuals who are incarcerated 
pretrial, regardless of whether they are ultimately convicted or not.114 
The normalization of pretrial losses could be due to the similarities 
between preventive and punitive detention, which allows society to 
accept whatever occurs behind bars as something that happens only to 
the guilty—even if the accused is presumed innocent. 
This prompts the question, should pretrial detainees—the legally 
innocent—be required to endure the same losses that legally guilty 
individuals must suffer as part of their punishment? Although the 
Supreme Court has held that conditions of incarceration may be 
equal,115 the Court has yet to address what degree of losses are 
acceptable and what should be done when incarceration proves to be 
unnecessary.  
It seems unlikely that a bright-line test will limit the type of 
foreseeable losses a pretrial detainee endures because such losses have 
been normalized.116 But there are other losses that could violate the 
accused’s constitutional rights—an unintended symptom of preventive 
justice.  
2. Unforeseeable Losses
Pretrial detainees may also suffer a loss of constitutional rights,
which is perhaps an unintentional and unanticipated byproduct of the 
for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals,” id. at 1520, 
and warned that “[j]ails can be even more dangerous than prisons because officials there 
know so little about the people they admit at the outset,” id. at 1521. 
113 Id. at 1524. 
114 See Manns, supra note 19, at 1971. 
115 Prisoner’s constitutional rights are subject to restrictions and limitations while 
incarcerated. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (“This principle applies equally to 
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. A detainee simply does not possess the full range 
of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.”). 
116 News accounts are riddled with stories of how defendants are affected by pretrial 
detention. One such story that gained national attention was that of Kalief Browder, who, at 
seventeen years old, was wrongfully arrested and placed in pretrial detention for three years 
on a $3,000 bail that he could not afford. Browder was subjected to several trips to solitary 
confinement and exposed to constant violence, all of which affected his mental health. 
See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/Q477-B2W5]. 
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preventive justice scheme.117 This Article maintains that such losses 
may be akin to punishment, which is not a purpose of preventive 
justice.118  
Prior to a conviction, the accused still retains, in theory, all the same 
rights as a free citizen, aside from those that interfere with his 
appearance at trial or relate to him posing a risk to the community.119 
For instance, the detainee should still retain the right of choice,120 the 
right to vote,121 and the right to educational access.122 Additionally, 
although it is not explicitly constitutionally guaranteed, the accused has 
right to familial community.123 In practice, these rights are not always 
honored.  
The extent to which losses of constitutional rights occur varies in 
degree. Take voting rights as an example. More than six million U.S. 
117 Infringements on one’s privacy are typically not considered a constitutional violation 
as applied to detainees in a jail or prison setting. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 287 
(1948) (“Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many 
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal 
system.”). This reasoning is criticized by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Bell, 441 U.S. at 
589–90. 
118 This Article does not go into depth on the distinction between unforeseeable punitive 
losses versus unforeseeable regulatory losses. This is perhaps better suited for a separate 
article. 
119 Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (“[A] detainee retains all 
rights of the ordinary citizen except those necessary to assure his appearance for trial. . . . 
‘[T]he conditions of incarceration for detainees must, cumulatively, add up to the least 
restrictive means of achieving the purpose requiring and justifying the deprivation of 
liberty.’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. 
Ark. 1971)). 
120 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“[T]he right of the woman 
to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference 
from the State.”). 
121 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (“Undeniably the Constitution of the 
United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal 
elections.”); see also McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 803 
(1969) (discussing the right to obtain absentee ballots); O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 
525 (1974). 
122 Although education may not be a fundamental right under the Constitution, the Court 
found that “[i]n addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and 
cultural heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to 
one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221–22 
(1982). 
123 See, e.g., Danushka S. Medawatte et al., Justice in Dire Straits: Unlawful Pretrial 
Detainees, Family Members and Legal Remedies, 22 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 201 
(2015–16) (“One of the main connections between unlawful pretrial detention and the family 
members of a detainee is that the family nexus is immediately affected by the detention.”); 
see also Rhem, 371 F. Supp. at 601 (discussing the impact to incarcerated persons when 
prohibited from engaging in contact visits and its psychological effects). 
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citizens are disenfranchised because of a felony conviction.124 
Disenfranchisement laws vary widely across the United States.125 Two 
states have adopted the most liberal position, and have done away with 
disenfranchisement, to ensure that everyone retains the right to vote.126 
On the other hand, three other states have adopted the most restrictive 
position that permanently disenfranchises individuals after a felony 
conviction.127 The remaining states fall somewhere in between and 
enforce disenfranchisement laws for a set period of time.128  
But for states that have disenfranchisement laws, they are triggered 
only by a felony conviction, as opposed to a misdemeanor 
conviction.129 Therefore, citizens who are detained prior to trial 
or incarcerated for a misdemeanor offense still maintain the right 
to vote (notwithstanding any disqualifying felony convictions).130 
Unfortunately, a number of barriers exist that prevent these individuals 
from exercising their right to vote. These barriers primarily stem from 
inaccessibility making voting in jail either impractical or impossible.131 
For instance, while incarcerated individuals rely heavily on jail staff for 
information on policies and processes, the lack of education and 
preparation by jail staff to facilitate the registration of voters or provide 
absentee ballots often creates a barrier to vote.132 Thus, the 
unavailability of voting ballots or access to polling stations has led to 
de facto disenfranchisement for pretrial detainees.133  
124 Six Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016, 
THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/ 
6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [https://perma.
cc/SQ4V-3J8R] [hereinafter Six Million Lost Voters].
125 Id. 
126 The two states are Maine and Vermont. VOTING WHILE INCARCERATED, ACLU 
1 (2005) [hereinafter VOTING, ACLU], https://www.aclu.org/issues/voting-rights/voter-
restoration/felony-disenfranchisement-laws-map [https://perma.cc/XV7Z-3QVP]. 
127 The three states include Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia. Id. 
128 Six Million Lost Voters, supra note 124. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. 
131 Instances have been noted where misunderstandings have occurred among correction 
officials, such as officials incorrectly believing that all those who are incarcerated do not 
have a right to vote, etc. See VOTING, ACLU, supra note 126, at i. There are small, 
but growing, initiatives taking place in California and Illinois to increase voter rights 
education in jails. See Disenfranchisement News: Expanding Voter Rights Education in 
Jails, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (July 19, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/ 
disenfranchisement-news-expanding-voter-rights-education-in-jails/ [https://perma.cc/4ARE-
DLJT]. 
132 Id. 
133 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 590 n.22 (1978); McDonald v. Bd. of 
Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). Voting is a fundamental right for every U.S. 
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Slowly, courts are beginning to recognize the inherent problems 
with a criminal legal system that does not make a distinction between 
pretrial detainees and those serving a sentence.134 Mere recognition, 
though, is not enough to remedy such deeply ingrained and normalized 
practices.  
II 
COMPENSATING FOR TIME LOST: AN ANALOGY TO TIME SERVED 
As discussed above, litigation avenues may be ineffective at making 
individuals whole again, and it may be costly and impractical to create 
greater procedural protections beyond those required by the law.135 
The value of time lost by each individual who endures a period of 
unnecessary pretrial incarceration varies greatly and is difficult to 
quantify.136 In an effort to address the multitude of problems with 
preventive detention, we must consider how best to assign value to the 
time lost by those unnecessarily incarcerated.  
In the existing paradigm, there is a long-standing judicial practice of 
valuing time lost through time served credits.137 The theory of crediting 
time served for individuals incarcerated prior to their conviction can be 
thought of as compensation for spending time in jail while legally 
innocent.138 The practice of crediting defendants for time served 
citizen. The inability to exercise one’s right as a citizen cannot be monetized. In instances 
such as this, where a deprivation is so large, pretrial compensation does not even come close 
to restoring right entitlements. But it is better than nothing. 
134 Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (“Pre-trial detention is 
nothing less than punishment. An unconvicted accused who is not allowed . . . bail is 
deprived of his liberty.”); Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 311 n.5 (E.D. La. 2018) 
(“This Court finds that the post-conviction detention cases, while not directly on point, are 
highly relevant because the liberty interests of presumptively innocent, pretrial detainees 
cannot be less than, and are generally considered greater than, those of convicted 
defendants.”). 
135 Displacing Due Process argues for stronger adherence to the existing procedural 
protections, and further, that the existing ones are watered down based on the assumption 
that a trial will occur. Makar, supra note 33, at 450 (“Salerno advocates for heightened 
procedural protections, but those protections are never actualized because of the assumption 
that further process is still forthcoming. The result is a deformation of substantive rights by 
way of deprivations of pre-trial liberty.”). 
136 See supra Part I. 
137 See Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 
1148 (2013). 
138 See Manns, supra note 19, at 1951 (“The federal government and many states have 
tacitly recognized the costs inflicted on pretrial detainees by creating a system of 
‘compensation’ of limited scope and coverage. The most common form of compensation is 
a set-off of time served in detention against criminal sentences.”). 
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provides a logical framework for understanding why our society 
currently does not compensate the accused for time lost through 
unnecessary incarceration.  
This section will explore the principle of time served and discuss the 
inconsistencies it creates within our system between the legally 
innocent and the legally guilty. 
A. A Critical Analysis of Time Served Credits
If an individual is arrested, placed under preventive detention, and 
found guilty by means of a trial, it would make a good deal of sense 
that she be guaranteed a right to credit for the time she already spent 
incarcerated, as time spent in jail pretrial would appear to be equal to 
time spent in jail posttrial. But courts have rarely considered whether 
credit for time served prior to trial is constitutionally required.139 
Although there is no controlling Supreme Court case law entitling 
detainees to a constitutional right to time served credits,140 many states 
voluntarily implemented statutes to prevent punishment in excess of a 
statutory maximum sentence.141 
Even without an affirmative constitutional right to time served, 
federal and state statutes require providing credit for time served.142 
Despite the legally stated distinctions between preventive and punitive 
139 Comment, Credit for Time Served Between Arrest and Sentencing, 121 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1148, 1148–49 (1973) (noting two predominant reasons: lack of standing and already 
existing legislative statutes that provide credit for time served). 
140 See id. at 1150 (“Three constitutional bases . . . from which to derive a right to credit 
for presentencing incarceration: the double jeopardy clause, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, and the cruel and unusual punishment clause.”); see also Gonzalez v. Comm’r of 
Corr., 68 A.3d 624, 641 (Conn. 2013) (holding that an attorney who did not seek a bond 
increase for his client in two prior cases in order to ensure the client was able to maximize 
the amount of presentence credit acted prejudicially and violated Strickland); Kolber, supra 
note 137, at 1149 (beginning a discussion of proportionality and credit for time served). 
141 See also Kolber, supra note 137, at 1148 (discussing that most jurisdictions will 
require judges to give credit for time served if the offender would otherwise be imprisoned 
for longer than the statutory maximum). In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court has 
said that prohibiting the credit for time served in reconviction cases would result in double 
jeopardy. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718–19 (1969) (footnote omitted) (“We 
hold that the constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense 
absolutely requires that punishment already exacted must be fully ‘credited’ in imposing 
sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense. If, upon a new trial, the defendant is 
acquitted, there is no way the years he spent in prison can be returned to him. But if he is 
reconvicted, those years can and must be returned—by subtracting them from whatever new 
sentence is imposed.”), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Although the 
Supreme Court has not addressed the exact issue, it is likely that Pearce would lead to the 
conclusion that time served credit is constitutionally required. 
142 18 U.S.C. § 3585 (2012). 
632 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 607 
detention, such statutes act as an affirmative nod to the similarities 
between these two forms of detention. These similarities undermine the 
logic laid out in the landmark case, United States v. Salerno, which 
permits pretrial detention in criminal cases on the condition detention 
is not serving a punitive purpose.143 In order for preventive detention 
to be permissible, Salerno requires that the government show by clear 
and convincing evidence that the accused poses a danger to an 
individual or a community that cannot be regulated by pretrial release 
conditions.144  
Salerno opened the door for states to implement their own 
preventive detention statutes,145 creating a slippery slope between ex 
ante (referred to as “regulatory”) and post ante (referred to as 
“punitive”) detention.146 In explaining the distinction between the two 
forms of detention, the Supreme Court offered the overly simplistic 
definition that, as a matter of fact, regulatory incarceration (also known 
as pretrial detention or preventive detention) is pre-adjudicatory, 
and therefore, does not serve a punitive end.147 This implies that 
conversely, punitive incarceration can only be post-adjudicatory.148 
The Court, however, did not opine in what instances, if any, pretrial 
detention might amount to punishment. 
To ensure that maximum sentences are not exceeded, providing time 
served credits after a trial makes perfect sense. But, the concept of 
crediting time served is faced with some tension in the plea-bargaining 
context because it is difficult to conceptualize how much punishment 
is deserved and how to convert regulatory time to punitive time.  
First, let us look toward proportionality in sentencing. The concept 
of proportionality in punishment is essential—much of the penal aspect 
of the criminal legal system is based on the idea of punishment and 
143 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (noting that pretrial detention 
hearings permit the accused to have a right to request counsel, to testify, to present witnesses, 
to proffer evidence, and to cross-examine other witnesses, but fail to limit crimes eligible 
for detention hearings). 
144 Id. 
145 Shima Baradaran Baughman, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 723, 750 (2011).
146 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (internal citations omitted) (“Unless Congress expressly
intended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on 
‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned [to it].’”). 
147 Id. at 748–49. 
148 Id. 
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what the offender “deserves.”149 Providing credit for time served is 
incongruent with many principles of proportionality in this sense 
because it permits reducing the punitive benchmark (in other words, 
deviating from sentencing guidelines) in exchange for guilty pleas. 
Imagine an individual is charged with a crime that holds a maximum 
penalty of five years. She is held without bail, pursuant to her state’s 
preventive detention statute, for one year as she awaits trial. At this 
time, the prosecutor offers her a plea deal—that she plead guilty in 
exchange for four years of the maximum penalty suspended and credit 
for one of the five years as time already served. In other words, this 
deal would allow the defendant to walk out of jail as a free person in 
exchange for affirming her guilt.  
To laypeople, the idea of allowing accused criminals to go free in 
exchange for a mere admission of guilt seems almost laughable (after 
all, the defendant was deemed dangerous enough to be held prior to 
trial). But to institutional players, it is barely noticed and is one of the 
most common exchanges in day-to-day courtroom proceedings.150  
This example demonstrates the convenient logical shift that occurs 
when the legal system converts time spent incarcerated prior to trial 
from “regulatory” detention to  “punitive” credits.151 Dissecting the 
reasons for why the court system is so willing to characterize 
incarceration so differently depending on whether or not the accused 
has plead guilty is not a particularly easy task.152 
One argument may be that regulatory and punitive detention are 
merely labels for a legal fiction. In other words, there really is no 
distinction between pretrial detention and post-conviction detention, 
and regulatory detention does have an element of punishment. That 
would mean that pretrial detention is the precursor for conviction—that 
the justice system assumes that those incarcerated pretrial are 
149 For the purposes of this Article, I will limit the definition of proportionality to the 
idea of punishment that reflects the offense, but for a deeper discussion on proportionality 
and punishment see Kolber, supra note 137, at 1145 (addressing the various schools of 
thought on punishment and their responses to reconciling time served in the plea-bargaining 
context, noting that proportionality is the most widely captured idea by theorists). 
150 See generally Malcolm M. Feeley et al., Between Two Extremes: An Examination of 
the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Community Service Orders and Their Implications for 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 155 (1992). 
151 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 759 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority concludes that the 
Act is a regulatory rather than a punitive measure. The ease with which the conclusion is 
reached suggests the worthlessness of the achievement.”) (noting the Supreme Court 
explains this distinction with little detail, and Justice Marshall found the definition 
unpersuasive). 
152 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 111. 
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incarcerated because they are guilty (regardless of whether they are 
actually convicted).  
Alternatively, a second rationale could be that the criminal legal 
system may allow pretrial credits to be converted into punitive credits 
because our society acknowledges the importance of liberty. As such, 
even in recognizing the difference between regulatory and punitive 
detention, liberty taken prior to a legitimate conviction comes at such 
a grave cost that our legal system is willing to put aside principles of 
proportionality and compensate the defendant through a reduced 
sentence. 
In order for the justice system to maintain its legitimacy, the answer 
must be the latter: regulatory and punitive detention are materially 
different. In some instances, such as those arising out of national 
security, the two forms of detention appear different in practice because 
regulatory detention is used sparingly.153 When applied on a mass scale 
for common crimes, the argument is less convincing.  
Compensation for time served is available only to individuals who 
served time prior to a conviction. An implicit assumption is that the 
time lost while legally innocent and incarcerated holds significant 
value, as sentence terms can be reduced to nothing after a plea is 
accepted. But that implicit assumption is not applied consistently. This 
raises the question: If we give compensation to the convicted for their 
time served, why do we not compensate those cleared of all charges for 
their time lost? The remainder of this Article seeks to answer this very 
question.  
The concept of time served plays a significant role in the 
implementation of punishment and in an inmate’s release.154 The 
pragmatic benefits of time served credits (within the current scheme) 
are immense and have become ingrained in everyday practice: it 
provides for judicial economy by moving along plea deals155 and it 
153 See supra Part I. 
154 Kolber, supra note 137, at 1147–50 (discussing the history of time-served credits). 
155 Roberts, supra note 84, at 308 (“Perhaps the most coercive aspect of plea-bargaining 
in the lower criminal courts is pretrial detention for individuals held on bail that they cannot 
pay. In such cases, defendants must generally choose between remaining in jail to fight the 
case or taking an early plea with a sentence of time served or probation.”); see also Heaton 
et al., supra note 102, at 723 (“A defendant who is factually guilty and plans to plead guilty 
may wish to forgo bail simply to get the punishment over with, anticipating that she will 
receive credit for time served. On the other hand, a defendant who believes she has a strong 
case for innocence may have greater incentive to post bail to avoid being detained when 
innocent.”). 
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reduces the length of prison sentences.156 And now, because pretrial 
detention is so widely used, time served provides a recognized 
safeguard for defendants by preventing double jeopardy157 and 
excessive punishment.158 
Even with the conflicting tensions between regulatory and punitive 
detention, there is a necessary practicality that time served credit 
extends. In applying time served credits, the criminal legal system 
seems to be willing to return the benefit received by society to the 
defendant. There is a sense that time spent incarcerated has value, and 
therefore the sentence should reflect the debt already paid.159 
Objectively, the benefits that preventive detention provides to society 
in terms of community safety and expedited plea bargaining outweigh 
widespread questioning for its lack of principled feasibility.160 
B. The International Justification for Compensation
Unfortunately, time lost cannot be given back when a defendant is 
not convicted and thus never sentenced to time in prison. The only 
remedy left is monetary compensation to the unnecessarily 
incarcerated.161 The argument advocating for monetary compensation 
to those unnecessarily incarcerated, discussed above, is simple and 
logical, as it reduces the legal tensions created by the asymmetrical 
application of time served.162  
Time served credits are the only form of compensation in the United 
States that is offered to pretrial detainees.163 But some European 
countries have been providing compensation to pretrial detainees to 
varying degrees.164 The most favorable policies for pretrial detainees 
156 Kolber, supra note 137, at 1147. 
157 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 711 (1969). 
158 Id. 
159 Martinez, supra note 21, at 516. 
160 Both defense attorneys and their clients rely heavily on plea deals and the use of 
pretrial credits to develop a case. A favorable outcome does not simply mean winning a 
dismissal or securing a not guilty verdict, now it also means ensuring that if any time must 
be spent in jail, that it be the shortest amount possible. See Gonzalez v. Comm’r of Corr., 
68 A.3d 624, 646 (Conn. 2013) (holding that an attorney who did not seek a bond increase 
for his client in two prior cases in order to ensure his client was able to maximize the amount 
of presentence credit acted prejudicially and violated Strickland). 
161 Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a Specific Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 120 (2006) 
(“The most common form of substitutionary relief is money.”). 
162 See supra Section II. 
163 Cf. Martinez, supra note 21. 
164 See generally Gabriel Doménech-Pascual & Miguel Puchades-Navarro, 
Compensating Acquitted Pretrial Detainees, 43 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 166, 168 (2015) 
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have been implemented in Sweden, where those held without bail are 
entitled to compensation if they are not convicted.165 This Article refers 
to this policy as strict liability compensation. In such cases, a detainee 
is prohibited from receiving compensation only if she intentionally or 
negligently causes her own detention.166 Mere suspicion of guilt after 
an acquittal or dismissal is not grounds for forfeiting one’s right to 
pretrial compensation.167  
Pretrial compensation policies have also been enacted as a response 
against overzealous state preventive detention policies.168 For instance, 
Austria and Norway enacted strict liability compensation statutes 
similar to that of Sweden after the European Court of Human Rights 
“repeatedly ruled against these countries for violating the principle of 
the presumption of innocence.”169 Thus, pretrial compensation may be 
an effective deterrent against increasingly common cultures of 
incarceration.  
Given the posture of the pretrial stage and the lack of remedies 
available,170 it seems reasonable to advocate for a strict liability 
compensation scheme in the United States.171 The following section 
elaborates on unidentifiable bad actors in the criminal legal system that 
make a compelling case for a strict liability-based solution, such as 
compensation.172 
(explaining that European countries’ policies vary in how they decide whether to provide 
compensation. Some countries provide compensation only if the pretrial detention was 
unlawful, if there is a showing of negligence, or if the detainee is able to prove his innocence. 
The most favorable approach is a strict liability approach, whereby the detainee is entitled 
to compensation if he is not convicted). 
165 Hugo Tiberg, Compensation for Wrongful Imprisonment, in 38 SCANDINAVIAN 
STUDIES IN L. 479, 479–87 (2005). 
166 Doménech-Pascual & Puchades-Navarro, supra note 164, at 168–69. 
167 Id. at 169. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. (citing Sekanina v. Austria 13126/87 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 30 (1993); Asan Rushiti v. 
Austria 28389/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 31 (2000)). 
170 See supra Part I. 
171 See infra Part III. 
172 For the purposes of this proposal, it should be noted that the nuances of how such a 
policy should be drafted is not my focus. Rather, this Article seeks to shine a light on the 
gaping holes within our justice system and how a larger-scale solution can resolve them. 
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III 
PRETRIAL DETENTION AS PREVENTIVE JUSTICE: 
IDENTIFYING SYSTEMIC HURDLES AGAINST REFORM 
On its face, the idea of preventive justice makes sense—the 
government should act swiftly to protect the community from any 
imminent threats. In practice, however, the reach of preventive justice 
is often too broad. 
In analyzing compensation as a remedy to the unnecessary 
incarceration problem, the following sections explain two primary 
reasons why preventive justice fails in the everyday criminal legal 
system and why pretrial compensation has yet to gain traction: (1) a 
misguided application of legal innocence and (2) the compounding 
impact of predictive processes.  
A. The Application of Pretrial Innocence in the Shadows of the
Innocence Movement 
The Innocence Movement has been the dominant contributor to 
our collective understanding and application of “innocence.”173 
Scholarship and the law, however, have created two distinct categories 
of innocence—factual versus legal—and one is valued more than the 
other.174 These rhetorical distinctions, embedded in state statutes,175 
have calcified the common understanding of innocence, and created 
hurdles not only for those asserting post-conviction challenges but 
especially for those seeking pretrial relief.  
The following sections address how legal and factual innocence are 
defined by scholars and how states translate those distinctions into law 
in both post-conviction and pretrial cases. 
173 See Roberts, supra note 35, at 779 (“The Movement is a coalition of lawyers, 
activists, exonerated individuals, and others who have revealed the troubling reality and 
likely causes of erroneous convictions. The Movement’s core work has been exonerating 
wrongfully convicted individuals by proving their innocence and implementing legislative 
and other policy reforms designed to prevent future miscarriages of justice. Most 
exonerations have happened in serious felony cases, especially homicide and rape cases.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
174 See infra notes 176–81. 
175 See infra notes 182–88. 
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1. Post-Conviction Innocence
Wrongful convictions are convictions that were challenged and later
reversed.176 This means that an individual found guilty, but whose 
conviction is reversed on appeal, becomes innocent in the eyes of the 
law.177 Wrongful convictions can fall into two different innocence 
scenarios in the post-conviction context.178 For instance, if evidence 
surfaces after a conviction that proves the convicted individual’s 
innocence (DNA evidence is one well-known method of 
exoneration),179 then her conviction would be overturned and she 
would be subsequently released.180 This is referred to as factual or 
actual innocence.181 Alternatively, the convicted individual could 
appeal an unfavorable verdict by challenging an improper procedure 
that occurred during the trial.182 If she wins, her conviction would be 
overturned and remanded back to the lower court, where the prosecutor 
will decide whether to retry the case.183 This is commonly classified as 
legal innocence.184  
Some legal scholars have made the conscious decision to avoid 
terms like factual innocence and legal innocence. Instead they use 
176 William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 385–86 (1995) 
[hereinafter Laufer, Rhetoric of Innocence]. 
177 See, e.g., Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017) (“But once those 
convictions were erased, the presumption of their innocence was restored.”); Johnson v. 
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585 (1988) (“After a ‘conviction has been reversed, unless and 
until [the defendant] should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge.’”). 
178 Laufer, Rhetoric of Innocence, supra note 176, at 332 n.10. 
179 According to the National Registry of Exonerations, of the 139 exonerations added 
to the registry in 2017, seventeen exonerations (approximately 13%) were based on DNA 
evidence. In its executive report, the Registry reports that DNA exonerations now account 
for 21% of exonerations in the registry from 1989. Nevertheless, despite the popularity in 
DNA exonerations, eighty-four exonerations in 2017 were due to official misconduct by a 
government official. See Exonerations in 2017, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 
1, 2 (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.innocenceproject.org/report-exonerations-in-2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/EME6-C3W3]. 
180 Although this example is an oversimplification, it effectively conveys the dichotomy 
between factual and legal innocence as most scholars have recognized the weight factual 
innocence holds in exonerations. See generally Laufer, Rhetoric of Innocence, supra note 
176. 
181 Id. 
182 Id.; see also Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1174 (2013) (“[C]ommentators typically use terms like ‘legal 
innocence’ to describe defendants whose convictions resulted from significant procedural 
error but who are not factually innocent, or at least cannot establish their factual 
innocence.”). 
183 Laufer, Rhetoric of Innocence, supra note 176, at 332 n.10. 
184 Cf. id. at 331 n.4. 
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terms that place emphasis on the error, as opposed to the individual.185 
For instance, terms such as substantive error and procedural error are 
commonly used to categorize the different forms of wrongful 
convictions.186 Professor John Martinez explains that the term 
substantive error still “refers to someone who is factually innocent of 
the offense for which they were convicted.”187 On the other hand, 
a wrongful conviction due to procedural error “refers to someone . . . 
convicted through tainted procedures, such as denial of Miranda 
warnings or prosecutorial concealment of exculpatory evidence from 
the defense.”188  
Both sets of terms effectively have the same meaning, but the way 
they frame the issue of innocence is materially different. Legal 
innocence focuses on the defendant herself, as if to imply that some 
degrees of innocence are lesser than others.189 The term procedural 
error instead highlights that the error was committed by the system.190 
The rhetoric used to conceptualize wrongful convictions matters 
because it demonstrates a preconceived notion that values one form of 
innocence over another.191 In the past, this has affected advocacy 
efforts that attempted to increase compensation schemes for exonerees 
who may have benefited from a procedural error as opposed to a factual 
one, resulting in the politicization of such issues.192  
185  Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1645–51 (2008) 
(Although “[t]he word ‘innocence’ is used casually in the media and by lawyers, convicts, 
scholars, and courts,” some scholars have defined the term more narrowly as “those who did 
not commit the charged crime.”); Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
1083, 1090 (2011) (“[P]itting actual innocence against legal innocence dilutes what 
innocence means.”). 
186 Martinez, supra note 21, at 517–18 (internal citations omitted). 
187 Id. at 518 (internal citations omitted). Note that while this source uses the term 
substantive “wrongfulness,” this Article will continue to use the synonymous term “error” 
for clarity and consistency. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. (“‘Innocence Projects’ throughout the United States are focused on helping 
factually innocent people—those who ‘didn’t do it’—as opposed to those who might have 
been convicted through a procedural irregularity.”). 
190 Id. at 518–19. 
191 See Roberts, supra note 35, at 816–19. 
192 Common shortcomings in existing compensation legislation include 
[r]efusing to enact uniform, statutory access to wrongful conviction compensation.
Some states opt to compensate the wrongfully convicted only via ‘private
compensation bills.’ This approach[] politicizes compensation based on the
individuals and policymakers involved; requires exonerees to mount costly and
demanding political campaigns; and threatens to deny appropriate—or any—
compensation to those who truly deserve it.
640 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 607 
The type of innocence at issue influences institutional players’ 
assumptions about the previously convicted, resulting in skewed 
applications of law.193 A review of state compensation statutes 
demonstrates how some of these distinctions between legal and factual 
innocence are cemented into law. For instance, Colorado,194 Florida,195 
New Hampshire,196 and Missouri197 all require exonerees to be found 
“actually innocent” in order to receive compensation for time 
incarcerated. Some states do not provide any form of compensation for 
exonerees,198 and others offer a pittance.199  
The shift in innocence rhetoric by scholars—from distinguishing 
between the types of innocence to the errors that resulted—is a step 
toward holding the criminal legal system accountable for some of its 
deeply rooted flaws. At present, however, many of the same trappings 
from the Innocence Movement that originally focused on the type of 
innocence are mirrored in the pretrial context. As explained below, this 
See Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT [hereinafter INNOCENCE 
PROJECT], https://www.innocenceproject.org/compensating-wrongly-convicted/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z35F-ASYX] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). 
193 Scholar William Laufer has written at great length about the rhetoric of innocence in 
the post-conviction context. To briefly summarize, Laufer observed early on that 
“Blackstonian maxims suggesting that society places greater value on freeing the guilty over 
convicting the blameless underscore the disutility of erroneous convictions. Given the 
reverence for this disutility it is not surprising that rhetoric has developed around those 
stages of the criminal process where guilt determinations are made.” Laufer, Rhetoric of 
Innocence, supra note 176, at 387 (citations omitted). 
194 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-103(1) (2018). 
195 FLA. STAT. § 961.03 (2018). 
196 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(II) (2019). 
197 MO. REV. STAT. § 650.058(1) (2016). 
198 The following states do not have a wrongful conviction compensation statute: 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
and Wyoming. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 192. In 2012 in Arizona, a state 
without a wrongful conviction compensation statute, Khalil Rushdan was released after 
being wrongfully convicted for first degree felony murder in 1997. A federal district court 
overturned Khalil’s conviction on evidence of vindictive prosecution. See Khalil Rushdan, 
AZ JUSTICE PROJECT, https://www.azjusticeproject.org/khalil-rushdan [https://perma.cc/ 
N7SN-LB67] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). Even in states where compensation statutes are in 
place, a lack of state funding often leads to delays in compensation. See, e.g., George Hunter, 
State Says It’s Short on Cash for the Wrongfully Convicted, DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2019/02/11/not-enough-money-
wrongfully-convicted-compensation-fund/2788073002/ [https://perma.cc/5E67-XT98]. 
199 E.g., Wisconsin compensates petitioners found innocent by a state claims board at a 
rate of $5,000 per year, not to exceed $25,000. WIS. STAT. § 775.05(4) (2018). 
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idée fixe with the form of innocence is most obviously embodied in 
false assumptions of guilt stemming from arrests.200 
2. Pretrial Innocence
Unlike in wrongful conviction cases, the lines between factual
innocence and legal innocence in the pretrial context are blurred.201 In 
the event you are arrested and detained prior to trial, imagine two 
different (and highly probable) scenarios that may result in your 
release. One, the prosecutor drops the charges against you because they 
lack sufficient evidence. Two, you take a plea for a lesser charge to get 
out of jail. These scenarios have little to do with your “factual” 
innocence; either scenario could occur regardless of whether you 
committed the crime you were arrested for. Instead, these scenarios 
demonstrate that pretrial exoneration depends more on “legal” or 
“procedural” innocence.202 
Yet, just as in wrongful conviction cases, “legal innocence” appears 
to be less valuable than “actual innocence.” States functionally treat 
pretrial innocence as legal innocence when it comes to restitution and 
compensation (in other words, there is virtually no opportunity for 
recourse against the state).203  
The rhetoric used by institutional players has also imported the 
negative influence of our understanding of post-conviction innocence 
to the pretrial context. For instance, a Baltimore district court judge 
authorized release with home detention for Phillip Stanley West, who 
was charged with fatally shooting another individual at a local bar.204 
The decision to release205 West garnered significant public backlash 
200 See infra Section III.A.2. 
201 See Roberts, supra note 111. 
202 These scenarios do not consider the possibility of a pretrial detainee going to trial as 
the primary goal of this Article is to demonstrate the arbitrary relationship between pretrial 
detention outcomes and conviction outcomes. 
203 In the post-conviction context there is “an assumption that society is unwilling to 
pamper criminals.” Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1009, 1033 (2013). In the same way that society does not wish to “pamper” criminal
offenders who “got off” on a procedural error by providing monetary compensation for time
wrongfully served, the same sentiment is likely shared toward pretrial detainees, who are
often perceived as guilty upon arrest. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 111.
204 Tim Prudente, Judge Grants Bail to Baltimore Man Accused of Barroom Murder in 
Fells Point, BALT. SUN (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-
ci-west-bail-20190116-story.html [https://perma.cc/4M4M-E95U]. 
205 It should be noted that much of the public commentary on this case deemphasized 
the fact that West was released with the condition of private GPS home monitoring that he 
had to pay for out of pocket. Instead, many commentators made it appear as if West was 
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from prominent government officials and the police commissioner.206 
But even when the presumption of innocence is honored, public outrage 
can reverse course. Several months later, a circuit court judge revoked 
West’s bail without evidence that he violated the terms of his pretrial 
release.207 Public comments made by institutional players credited with 
knowing the ins-and-outs of the justice system fuel public opinion and 
inform the way society feels about those accused of a crime.208  
In our society, the stigma of an arrest often overshadows209 the 
presumption of innocence.210 When we see someone being placed in 
the back of a cop car, the first thought that comes to mind is “what did 
that guy do?”211 The popular narrative is that someone arrested is as 
good as guilty, despite the principle of “innocent until proven guilty.”212 
released unconditionally. GPS monitoring is one of the more onerous pretrial release 
restrictions, particularly when an individual is subjected to home detention. In the eyes of 
the law, home detention is equivalent to pretrial detention, and time served credit is often 
given to individuals who are restricted to home detention. See Hope Caldwell, Strong 
Dissent, But House Arrest on Parole Equals Time Served, 6 LAW. J. 2 (2004). 
206 Thiru Vignarajah, Release of Murder Suspect a Symptom of Baltimore Ills, BALT. 
SUN (Jan. 23, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-
op-0124-bail-baltimore-20190123-story.html [https://perma.cc/D5V5-MS83] (calling for 
West to be held without bail, assuming that “[p]rosecutors should have no trouble getting 
this dangerous error swiftly reversed”). City Councilman Zeke Cohen, representative of 
Fells Point, stated on Facebook, “This is not about the presumption of innocence . . . . This 
defendant will have his day in court. This is about public safety.” Tim Prudente, Baltimore 
Judge Revokes Bail for Man Accused of Barroom Murder in Fells Point, BALT. SUN 
(Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-west-bail-revoked-
20190412-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y8H6-VEY3]. Interim Police Commissioner Gary 
Tuggle also previously stated, “When we see individuals being let out, that goes to whether 
or not there’s a deterrent to committing crime . . . . We need to have that bail process be a 
reflection of deterrence.” Id. 
207 See Prudente, supra note 206. 
208 See generally Anna King & Shadd Maruna, The Function of Fiction for a Punitive 
Public, CAPTURED BY THE MEDIA: PRISON DISCOURSE IN POPULAR CULTURE 16 (Paul 
Mason ed., 2006). 
209 Brandon L. Garrett, The Myth of the Presumption of Innocence, 94 TEX. L. REV. 178, 
180 (2016) (“Observers have long described the oft recited ‘myth that a person is presumed 
to be innocent until proven guilty’ following arrest.”); see also Jeff Thaler, Punishing the 
Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 
WIS. L. REV. 441, 441 (1978). 
210 See Baughman, supra note 145, at 727–38 (summarizing the history of presumption 
of innocence as it pertains to bail). 
211 Cf. Robert Siegel, All Things Considered: See Why the Public Perception of Crime 
Exceeds the Reality, NPR (July 26, 2016, 4:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/07/26/ 
487522807/why-the-public-perception-of-crime-exceeds-the-reality [https://perma.cc/D3J5- 
J6ES] (“[T]he news media has always over-reported violent crime . . . . You know, if it 
bleeds it leads, particularly in local television news.”). 
212 Martin Schönteich, Presumption of Guilt: The Global Overuse of Pretrial Detention, 
OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS. 1, 8 (2014), https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/de4c18f8-
2020] Unnecessary Incarceration 643
Professor Anna Roberts conducted an extensive analysis demonstrating 
this point.213 In her article, Arrests as Guilt, Professor Roberts catalogs 
the various instances in which this illegitimate fusion between arrests 
and assumptions of guilt occurs.214 For example, instead of calling the 
arrested individual “the accused,” he is referred to as “the offender.”215 
This tension has played out in courts as well. In the past, the 
Supreme Court implicitly discounted the idea that the presumption of 
innocence should be factored into pretrial release decisions.216 
Specifically, in Bell v. Wolfish, a case challenging the jail conditions of 
the petitioner’s pretrial detention, Justice Rehnquist introduced the 
notion that “[t]he presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates 
the burden of proof in criminal trials.”217 Using this statement as 
support, some have claimed that the presumption of innocence is only 
a trial-based right and nothing more.218 Therefore, the presumption of 
innocence, according to this view, does not provide procedural 
protections at the pretrial phase.  
Fast-forward to 2017 (almost four decades after Bell), and Justice 
Rehnquist’s line was used in Nelson v. Colorado to justify the 
Government’s refusal to return funds that an exoneree paid to the State 
for a conviction that was later overturned.219 The Government’s 
argument in Nelson was that Bell held that the presumption of 
innocence does not apply outside the trial, stating that “‘[t]he 
presumption of innocence applies only at criminal trials’ and thus has 
ccc1-4eba-9374-e5c850a07efd/presumption-guilt-09032014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GVA-
NCW5] (“Little public sympathy exists for pretrial detainees and their plight. Many people 
mistakenly believe that detainees should be presumed guilty by virtue of their detention 
status.”). 
213 See generally Roberts, supra note 111 (arguing that the concept of arrests and guilt 
are often illegitimately fused together resulting in significant consequences for the arrested 
individual as he proceeds through the criminal legal system). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 1005. 
216 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). 
217 Id. 
218 Laufer, Rhetoric of Innocence, supra note 176, at 335 n.26 (“The presumption of 
innocence is commonly thought of as a factual presumption when it is at most a presumption 
of legal innocence and, at least, an ineffective rhetorical device. It is often said that ‘one is 
presumed innocent, until proven guilty.’ This maxim has come to mean that the burden of 
production and persuasion falls on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”). 
219 See Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 n.8 (2017). 
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no application here.”220 Justice Ginsburg explicitly noted that this 
statement was an incorrect interpretation of Bell.221  
Justice Ginsburg wrote, “Our opinion in [Bell] recognized that 
‘under the Due Process Clause,’ a detainee who ‘has not been adjudged 
guilty of any crime’ may not be punished.”222 Through this dicta, the 
Court makes clear that the only instance where the presumption of 
innocence does not apply is after conviction—that is, punishment.223 
In other words, the presumption does more than merely place the 
burden on the State to prove guilt during a hearing, as Justice Rehnquist 
suggested; it applies well before the trial, meaning the legally innocent 
have the right to receive property that was taken as part of a punishment 
that is now overturned.224 
This opinion is a turning point because it emphasizes legal innocence 
as grounded in a due process right and mandates the return of property 
to remedy the constitutional violation.225 Although Nelson is not a case 
concerning pretrial detention, it is nonetheless pivotal because the 
majority’s holding is based on the fact that the individual’s legal status 
has changed from legally guilty to legally innocent.226 This is a 
significant deviation from the treatment of innocence in post-
conviction cases, discussed above.  
Even with this shift in analysis, many may struggle with the idea of 
holding the criminal legal system accountable when no bad actor is 
identified. It is true that the State cannot provide a remedy for every 
harm that occurs, especially when that harm caused appears to be 
220 Id. at 1255. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. at 1256. This decision is based on the defendant’s return to “innocence” and 
will be discussed in greater depth below. 
225 Id. at 1260–61. Justice Alito lamented about how pivotal this opinion could be, as it 
arguably entitled the defendant to recover for other losses as well: 
For example, if the status quo ante must be restored, why shouldn’t the defendant 
be compensated for all the adverse economic consequences of the wrongful 
conviction? After all, in most cases, the fines and payments that a convicted 
defendant must pay to the court are minor in comparison to the losses that result 
from conviction and imprisonment, such as attorney’s fees, lost income, and 
damage to reputation. 
Id. 
226 Id. at 1258 (“In holding that these payments must be refunded, the Court relies on a 
feature of the criminal law, the presumption of innocence.”). 
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negligence.227 We must consider what happens, however, when the 
cause is negligence compounding upon negligence. The following 
section explores this argument.  
B. The Compounding Impact of Predictive Processes
Preventive justice requires overgeneralizations and stereotypes to 
determine where the largest concentration of danger may occur.228 
Whenever each player in the system—police officer, prosecutor, and 
judge—is forced to engage in a predictive assessment, errors 
compound upon errors.229 Consequently, inequalities are highlighted 
through this error-prone system, resulting in a disproportionate number 
of marginalized community members being jailed.230  
Let us consider a typical case, taken from my own practice 
representing individuals charged with crimes in Baltimore. Let us call 
the accused Romero Jones.231 
In early May 2017 in southwest Baltimore City, a BOLO (“be on 
lookout”) went out to all dispatched officers after an armed robbery. 
The BOLO described the perpetrator as an African American man 
wearing jeans, an orange T-shirt, and a baseball cap. At 1:00 a.m., 
police apprehended Romero Jones. Romero matched the description—
black male, orange T-shirt, wearing jeans—and was sitting on a bench, 
smoking a cigarette in the vicinity of the crime. When Romero was 
arrested, officers did not recover from his person any of the items that 
were reported stolen—no iPhone, no wallet, no knife.  
When he was brought before the judge to determine whether he 
would be released before trial, the evidence adduced so far was thus 
227 Cf. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 52–56 
(2018) (identifying that the concept of qualified immunity is derived from the common law 
good-faith defenses). 
228 See Cole, supra note 2 (“The impossibility of predicting the future means that when 
we impose sanctions based on future concerns rather than past acts, we inevitably must 
accept a lower standard of proof, and far greater risk of error . . . .”). 
229 See cf. Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 1309 (2017) (discussing the ways in which cumulative constitutional rights 
can be established by considering individual actions that if viewed in the aggregate can 
demonstrate a cognizable constitutional harm, whereas actions taken individually may not 
demonstrate a constitutional harm). Mayson, supra note 3, at 2251 (“The premise of 
prediction is that, absent intervention, history will repeat itself. So what prediction does is 
identify patterns in past data and offer them as projections about future events. If there is 
racial disparity in the data, there will be racial disparity in prediction too.”). 
230 See SAKALA, supra note 28. 
231 The name used is a pseudonym to protect the privacy of a former client. The facts 
provided are true. 
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mixed. On the one hand, Romero matched the description and was in 
the area of the crime. On the other hand, the description was very 
general, and nothing specific connected him to the crime. Nonetheless, 
given the random nature of the alleged crime, the bail review judge 
believed there was a risk that Romero was a danger to the community, 
and so he was held without bail.  
Can we second-guess this decision? Considering that the underlying 
crime was seemingly unprovoked and involved a weapon, it was in the 
government’s interest to detain the individual who engaged in this act. 
At this stage, it was safe to conclude that a robbery did occur and that 
another member of society was harmed. Without more information, 
however, it was impossible to know that Romero was in fact the culprit, 
or even that the attack was unprovoked. Therefore, it was also 
impossible to know whether Romero’s detention was necessary to keep 
the community safe.  
As it happens, after twenty-eight days of pretrial incarceration, 
Romero had all the charges dropped and was released from jail. Yet 
during this period of ultimately pointless incarceration, Romero lost 
primary custody of his child and was evicted from his apartment, which 
he had resided in for the past four years, for failure to pay rent. 
Moreover, Romero’s release was prompted because police caught the 
real culprit at a pawn shop selling the stolen goods that were never 
recovered from Romero. As it turns out, the night that Romero was 
arrested, he had attended an Orioles game where thousands of other 
individuals were also wearing orange T-shirts and baseball caps. 
Essentially, Romero lost his child and his home because he was in the 
wrong place at the wrong time, rooting for the wrong team.  
Surely police can catch the right offender in the first instance and 
prosecutors are able to tender a justly earned conviction, demonstrating 
that preventive justice measures can work. But in cases like Romero’s, 
we realize that the criminal legal system is imperfect, and that the 
wrong people may be unintentionally implicated.  
Preventive justice measures are inherently predictive, operating on 
fewer procedural safeguards so that the government can act fast.232 
When the government is permitted to act quickly, however, it is 
necessarily permitted to act without the complete picture.233 As such, 
232 See Cole, supra note 2, at 505 (“The impossibility of predicting the future means that 
when we impose sanctions based on future concerns rather than past acts, we inevitably 
must accept a lower standard of proof, and far greater risk of error . . . .”). 
233 See id. This applies equally to policing strategies and prosecuting strategies. See 
discussion infra Sections III.B.1–4. 
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that translates to acting on a lack of information (which is common at 
the early stages of the criminal legal system), but that cannot be the 
justification for someone like Romero to face such devastating losses 
such as primary custody of a child or housing.  
Romero’s example reflects a multilayered system that is based on 
small probabilities that build upon and validate each other in order to 
get to the final decision. The following sections dissect the stages of 
Romero’s case that began with his arrest and ended with his release to 
explain the compounding impact predictive processes have on a 
defendant as his case proceeds through the various “checkpoints” in the 
criminal legal system. 
1. Predictive Policing
Police officers routinely engage in predictive analysis in order to
increase successful outcomes in the future.234 Police departments use 
data to determine what modes of enforcement are successful and then 
replicate similar policing patterns.235 For instance, in order to 
determine which neighborhoods need the most surveillance, officers 
might use data and geographical arrest statistics, which have been 
collected over the years, to make a prediction.236 But because that data 
may be based on dirty policing tactics, it may reinforce negative 
associations with particular neighborhoods, seemingly by way of 
scientific validation.237 Consider fixed surveillance—when an officer 
is “staked out” in a certain location in an effort to observe crime that 
may or may not occur. Based on an officer’s prior experiences or the 
shared experiences of the precinct, an officer may be stationed at a 
234 See Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights 
Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 192, 196 (2019), https://www.nyulawreview.org/online-features/dirty-data-bad-
predictions-how-civil-rights-violations-impact-police-data-predictive-policing-systems-
and-justice/ [https://perma.cc/WK6A-JHZG] (noting recent police departments across the 
nation, such as the NYPD (2015) and the Baltimore Police Department (2018), who sought 
out or employed predictive policing software). 
235 Id. at 218. 
236 Id.; Issie Lapowsky, How the LAPD Uses Data to Predict Crime, WIRED (May 22, 
2010), https://www.wired.com/story/los-angeles-police-department-predictive-policing/ 
[https://perma.cc/W25L-56YF]. 
237 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 10 (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., 
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 11 (2015), https://www.justice. 
gov/crt/file/883296/download/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_ 
police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/22AX-9ZLB]. 
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particular street corner even if the officer has no reason to believe crime 
is afoot or likely to occur in that area at that time.238  
This approach, although seemingly effective in the sense that 
officers may identify individuals who are engaging in illicit acts at that 
specific location, also creates disparities in police presence across 
different zip codes.239 It is certainly smart to station more officers 
where crime has been historically shown to be more likely, but if more 
police officers are stationed in one area—regardless of whether it is 
actually a “high-crime area”—officers are bound to report more crimes 
than in an area where fewer officers are stationed. Because of 
predictive policing, some areas designated as high crime are bound to 
that fate.240 Such phrases have become shorthand legal speak that 
permits an officer to use his surroundings as a basis for probable cause 
to arrest (validating hunches as opposed to actual observations).241 It is 
not far-fetched to assert that predictive analysis tools generate negative 
feedback loops that result in the police not just responding to high 
crime areas, but creating high crime areas.242  
Romero was likely a victim of predictive policing. No evidence was 
found on him to indicate that he was involved in the robbery. 
Nonetheless, he was found in a high crime area, which also happened 
to be a few blocks from his home.  
Romero is a living example of how an individual’s zip code can be 
a representation of his socioeconomic level and his likelihood of 
238 Richardson et al., supra note 234, at 197. 
239 See id. at 218 (“If a group or geographic area is disproportionately targeted for 
unjustified police contacts and actions, this group or area will be overrepresented in the data, 
in ways that often suggest greater criminality.”). 
240 Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 
1148–49 (2017) (“The targeting of certain areas or certain races creates the impression of 
higher crime rates in those areas, which then justifies continued police presence there. . . . 
Essentially, high-crime areas . . . might only be considered ‘high’ because police already 
have data about those areas . . . .”). 
241 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000) (noting this is the first case 
that the Supreme Court gave extensive thought to the “high-crime area” factor); see also 
Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas, 107 CALIF. 
L. REV. 345 (2019) (conducting an empirical analysis on the impact of Illinois v. Wardlow
by examining data on investigative stops conducted by the New York Police Department).
242 E.g., Roberts, supra note 35, at 822 (“[W]hile class and particularly racial bias are 
problematic in the felony context, these injustices are amplified with misdemeanors. This is 
because most misdemeanor convictions flow from discretionary arrests made by police 
officers on the street. Those officers make decisions about which neighborhoods to police 
and who to arrest.”) (citations omitted); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and 
Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 630 (2014) (observing that misdemeanor 
arrests are “largely an artifact of policing practices”). 
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arrest.243 Marginalized individuals of color represent the majority of 
individuals in the jail system, even though they are not the majority of 
the U.S. population.244 That does not necessarily mean that they 
commit higher rates of crime, it just means they get caught more 
frequently.245 The increased frequency at which marginalized 
individuals are arrested makes their representation in the criminal legal 
system disproportionate.246 In the end, it is a self-fulling prophecy. 
There may very well be some areas that require visible police presence 
for community safety. But those areas should be consistently 
reassessed in the hopes of withdrawing police presence. Proper data 
validation practices help prevent such false validations.  
Nonetheless, predictive policing is only one link in a chain of 
problems. To be sure, officers do not make decisions regarding 
charges,247 only arrests. Yet even before the bail hearing stage, it is 
easy to see how the demographics of the accused are often already 
prefiltered by predictive policing. The following section considers the 
next stage, prosecution.  
2. Selective Prosecuting
Like police officers, prosecutors have limited powers. At the end of
the day, prosecutors do not decide to hold a particular defendant with 
or without bail—only a judge does.248 Similarly, prosecutors might 
have the power to make broad decisions regarding what they will or 
243 Heaton et al., supra note 102, at 737–38 (finding in Harris County, Texas, that 
defendants from the poorest zip codes are detained much more frequently than similarly-
situated defendants from high-income zip codes); Greg Kaufmann, Why Achieving the 
American Dream Depends on Your Zip Code, TALKPOVERTY (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://talkpoverty.org/2015/12/17/american-dream-zip-codes-affordable-housing/ [https:// 
perma.cc/W3HW-HYT4] (stating that a zip code is reflective of socioeconomic level). 
244 Reshaad Shirazi, It’s High Time to Dump the High-Crime Area Factor, 21 BERKELEY 
J. CRIM. L. 77, 87 (2016) (noting that African Americans account for 17% of drug users
nationwide but account for 37% of all those arrested for drug-related offenses); see also
Steven Raphael & Melissa Sills, Urban Crime, Race, and the Criminal Justice System in the
United States, in A COMPANION TO URBAN ECONOMICS 515, 529 (Richard J. Arnott &
Daniel P. McMillen eds., 2006) (noting that African Americans commit 25% of all violent
offenses in the United States, but account for only 13% of the population); see also Frank
Rudy Cooper, We Are Always Already Imprisoned: Hyper-Incarceration and Black Male
Identity Performance, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1185, 1200 (2013) (“[P]eople searched incident to
arrest will disproportionately be men of color.”).
245 See generally Shirazi, supra note 244, at 87. 
246 Robin G. Steinberg, Police Power and the Scaring of America: A Personal Journey, 
34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 131, 132 (2015). 
247 See Bellin, supra note 1, at 204–05. 
248 Id. at 205. 
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will not prosecute, but they cannot dictate what other actors do.249 For 
example, a prosecutor could decide they are no longer prosecuting 
marijuana crimes. But until the legislature makes a decision regarding 
marijuana crimes, police officers can still arrest people for marijuana 
crimes. Therefore, in that situation, the legislature arguably holds more 
power than prosecutors. The intentional selection of deciding whether 
to prosecute or not to prosecute a case is one way to imagine selective 
prosecution. In the alternative, a defendant may raise selective 
prosecution as a defense, asserting that the prosecutor brought a charge 
for reasons antecedent to equal protection.250 
Based on the interplay between other external actors, Professor 
Jeffrey Bellin contends that prosecutors are not vested with significant 
power and are merely facilitating their own goals that are approved by 
other more powerful actors.251 In the pretrial context, however, 
prosecutors arguably wield the most power because they can 
significantly influence the court. As such, less obvious forms of 
selective prosecuting can still occur in three discrete ways: (1) deciding 
who to charge, (2) deciding what to charge, and (3) deciding what 
release recommendations to offer at the bail hearing. 
First, with regard to how prosecutors identify who to charge, internal 
prosecutorial policies have been largely a black box. Current studies 
provide limited revealing statistics regarding selective prosecution.252 
This is due in part by the fact that most prosecutorial offices have 
lacked transparency-forward policies.253 As such, much of this 
assertion is based on courtroom anecdotes provided by public 
defenders.254  
249 Id. at 183–84. 
250 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“One of [the constitutional] 
constraints imposed by the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment is that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on ‘an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
251 Bellin, supra note 1, at 200. 
252 Numbers associated with selective prosecution are largely unknown because the only 
people who would know the data are prosecutors. See generally Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 456. 
253 See NICOLE ZAYAS FORTIER, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, UNLOCKING THE BLACK 
BOX: HOW THE PROSECUTORIAL TRANSPARENCY ACT WILL EMPOWER COMMUNITIES 
AND HELP END MASS INCARCERATION 8 (2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/ 
field_document/.aclu_smart_justice_prosecutor_transparency_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WP3F-8RAR] (advocating for the implementation of the Prosecutorial Transparency Act as 
part of the ACLU’s Campaign for Smart Justice). 
254 Since bail decisions are made by magistrates who work for the judiciary, not for 
the prosecutor’s office, a prosecutor’s power is often considered informal or influential at 
best. See, e.g., Aurelie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: 
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Second, prosecutors also have discretion when deciding what 
charges to bring (such as deciding between felony versus misdemeanor 
charges).255 This is particularly important at the bail stage and creates 
an immense advantage for the prosecutor. For instance, when deciding 
whether to charge a felony or misdemeanor assault, the prosecutor is 
indicating the severity of the alleged crime to the judge.256 Prosecutors 
are known for overcharging to their advantage.257 Prosecutors 
primarily upcharge to secure a conviction, which in the event they are 
unsuccessful on the top count, they are more likely to secure a 
conviction on lesser counts.258 But upcharging also places the 
prosecutor in a better position at bail, because a higher charge may 
facially indicate a higher level of dangerousness to some.259 
In Romero’s case, the victim reported that he was assaulted with a 
knife. Romero was never found with a knife. Although prosecutors 
The Influence of Prosecutors (George Mason Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 
LS 19-08, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335138## [https:// 
perma.cc/9XXS-X2R7] (“Progressive prosecutors frequently feature a promise to get rid of 
cash bail as part of their election platform. This is in line with public attention on the 
shortcomings of the current bail system in recent years. However, prosecutors have no direct 
power over bail. They can make requests and offer advice, but cannot decide outcomes. If 
they are influential at all, it is through informal channels. And these informal channels of 
influence rely on the discretion of numerous criminal justice actors with varying objective 
functions.”). 
255 Bellin, supra note 1, at 181 (“A prosecutor has discretion to choose . . . what crime 
to select. And within broad boundaries, the charging decision typically cannot be overruled 
by the courts or other actors, such as victims or police.”). 
256 For a discussion on charge piling see Crespo, supra note 17, at 1316–23. 
257 For example, based on my anecdotal experience litigating cases in Maryland, first-
offender juveniles are automatically afforded pretrial release with nonmonetary conditions, 
with the exception of first-degree assault or higher. If charged with one of these more serious 
felonies, the juvenile is taken before a judge for a bail hearing where he could be detained 
prior to trial. The Pretrial Justice Clinic at University of Baltimore (UB) Law represented a 
juvenile who was charged with throwing a punch during an after-school sporting event on 
school property in Baltimore City. Instead of resolving the case internally, police were 
called, and the juvenile was arrested. On the bare facts alone, many would consider this a 
misdemeanor assault. Instead, the juvenile was charged with a first-degree assault felony. 
This triggered a different protocol, where he was taken to a judge and held without bail. This 
juvenile missed a significant amount of school days. His case was ultimately dismissed. See 
also Crespo, supra note 17, at 1313 n.31 (discussing the impact a prosecutor has by piling 
on the quantity and quality of charges against the accused). 
258 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 185 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[Plea bargaining] 
presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent 
defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense . . . .”). 
259 These shorthand indicators of dangerousness, like the charge itself, are impermissible 
but are nonetheless exploited by prosecutors to convey to the court that the defendant is 
dangerous by mere association with a certain charge. Unfortunately, it often works. See 
supra notes 204–07. 
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could not initially prove a knife was used, let alone by Romero, he was 
still charged with felony armed robbery—a crime with a maximum 
penalty of twenty years, as opposed to misdemeanor theft under $1,000, 
which holds a maximum penalty of ninety days. If it were the latter 
charge, the prosecutor may have recommended that Romero be 
released on his own recognizance with pretrial release supervision. But 
with a heightened charge, we see how the prosecutor has more leverage 
to make harsher pretrial recommendations.  
Third, in deciding what release recommendations to offer, 
prosecutors often ground recommendations in concerns over larger 
societal issues that the crime at issue may represent.260 Drug-related 
crime is the most common example of this.261 For instance, if an 
individual is caught with a large amount of contraband—no weapons, 
just contraband—prosecutors may argue that he is not only a danger to 
the buyer but the public as well because he is perceived to be the anchor 
of a community’s drug addiction problem.262 Some prosecutors may 
even argue that the sale of drugs is a violent crime. The issue of 
violence arises not because weapons were involved or an assault 
occurred but because the presence of drugs, many believe, often leads 
to the use of guns.263 This is of course speculative, but the prosecutor 
making this argument would effectively be saying that if we do not 
incarcerate this individual, he will continue to engage in criminal acts 
that will more likely than not lead to worse problems down the road.264 
260 The rules of evidence do not apply during bail hearings, and as a result, prosecutors 
will often make loftier arguments as to how one individual’s alleged criminal conduct 
contributes to a larger problem within the community. Such anecdotes are rarely 
documented, unless they make headlines. See, e.g., supra notes 205–08. 
261 At least eight states have declared the opioid crisis a state of emergency. See, e.g., 
Bill Turque, Maryland Governor Declares State of Emergency for Opioid Crisis, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/hogan-declares-
opioid-state-of%20emergency/2017/03/01/5c22fcfa-fe2f-11e6-99b4-9e613afeb09f_story. 
html?utm_term=.bbb64354b2e9 [https://perma.cc/5JMF-PGWK]. 
262 United States v. Hardy, 895 F.2d 1331, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Congress 
mandated severe penalties for drug distribution, reflecting legislative sentiment that 
commercial trafficking and drug distribution had the dangerous effect of drawing others into 
the web of drug abuse. . . . In reviewing narcotics convictions, the Court must be careful to 
maintain the distinction, created by Congress in the statute, between distribution and 
personal drug abuse.”). 
263 Stephen Changary, Drugs, Not Guns, Cause Gun Violence, DAILY ADVANCE 
(Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.dailyadvance.com/Letters/2018/02/01/012918changarylet.html 
[https://perma.cc/5ZQQ-UFVW] (“So the real problem of gun violence is a drug problem 
. . . .”). 
264 Press Release, Commonwealth of Pa. Office of Att’y Gen., Office of Attorney 
General Seeks $1 Million Bail for Drug Dealers (Sept. 13, 2017) (on file with the Office of 
Attorney General) (“Nine drug dealer suspects arrested in Philadelphia following a major 
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These discretionary elements of prosecuting at the pretrial stage 
have the ability to cause significant damage in terms of increasing 
carceral trends. The leverage afforded to the prosecution in seeking a 
denial of bail through an error-prone system that lacks adequate checks 
necessarily taints any positive correlations that can be drawn between 
these denials of bail and case outcome, particularly guilty pleas. 
Nonetheless, correlations are likely made, reinforcing a negative 
feedback loop of information. 
3. Equitable Interpretation
Courts rely heavily on prosecutors and their recommendations when
making bail determinations for two simple reasons: (1) judicial 
economy and (2) lack of information.265  
First, state courts are plagued by large numbers of cases, requiring 
courts to move cases forward at a faster clip.266 In order to cope with 
the number of cases, lower courts have adopted a practice of equitable 
interpretation—applying the law in a manner that is most reasonable 
given the system they are operating within.267 This means that full 
procedural protections are often pushed to the wayside. This is because 
the general sentiment is that a bail hearing should not become a 
minitrial because there is simply not enough time and resources to 
provide the necessary amount of individualization.268  
Second, there is an information deficit at the bail stage. Although a 
significant number of facts can be adduced within the first twenty-four 
or forty-eight hours after a crime occurs, the theory of the case is still 
in development and evidence is still being processed at the crime lab. 
At this point, prosecutors have the most complete picture of the crime. 
Defendants are at an information deficit because not all discovery has 
raid that resulted in the seizure of 30,000 to 40,000 bags of suspected heroin and fentanyl 
. . . . The Office of the Attorney General is seeking high bail, citing the dealers’ danger to 
the community . . . . ‘These drug dealers put an entire community at risk by their criminal 
conduct . . . drug dealing is not a victimless crime.’”). 
265 See Makar, supra note 33, at 448–49. 
266 Appellees noted in a 2016 filing that Harris County judges held approximately 50,000 
bail hearings for individuals charged with misdemeanors in 2015 alone. O’Donnell v. Harris 
Cty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). 
267 See generally Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the 
Collaborative Era of American Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L. REV. 711, 713 (2018). 
268 Zina Makar, Opinion, Bail Reform Begins with the Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/opinion/bail-reform-begins-with-the-bench. 
html [https://perma.cc/Z3AH-DLY6] (“Judges routinely refuse to review other evidence—
from, say, cellphone videos or alibi witnesses—that may ultimately exonerate an individual, 
stating it can only be introduced at trial.”). 
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been turned over. As such, a prosecutor’s recommendation carries 
immense weight in the eyes of the court, which can ultimately skew 
results to the detriment of the defendant. 
The state district court in Romero’s case did not question the 
prosecutor’s recommendation. The seriousness of the crime and the 
matching clothing description were enough to hold Romero without 
bail.  
Relatedly, access to counsel at the pretrial stage also works to 
convey the importance of a pretrial hearing to the court. Although 
Romero had a public defender who pointed out the discrepancies in the 
statement of probable cause, defendants in other states can be much 
worse off.269 Certain state policies have contributed to the perception 
that fewer precautions are necessary during the bail stage.270 For 
instance, several states, such as North Carolina, do not guarantee a right 
to counsel at the bail stage.271 That is problematic, particularly for 
individuals facing possible loss of liberty.272 Lack of counsel creates 
the impression that pretrial hearings are not critical or that such 
hearings do not affect case outcomes.273  
Although state laws may differ, there is an overall reluctance to 
reform the front end of the system due to the perceived unimportance 
of the pretrial stage and the anticipation of the trial stage. This 
reluctance to reform the pretrial system is also demonstrated by the fact 
269 Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal 
Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1722–23 (2002) 
(conducting an empirical study on the impact defense attorneys have in bail hearings). 
270 Failure to provide counsel in preventive detention hearings where the potential is 
high for the loss of individual liberty prior to trial is one such example. Such state failings 
undercut the federal requirement mandated in United States v. Salerno, which is arguably 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., John P. Gross, The 
Right to Counsel but Not the Presence of Counsel: A Survey of State Criminal Procedures 
for Pre-Trial Release, 69 FLA. L. REV. 831 (2017) (arguing that the failure of the Supreme 
Court to hold the bail stage as a critical stage has allowed states to withhold providing 
counsel during bail hearings resulting in higher rates of pretrial incarceration). 
271 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451 (2008); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years 
After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11 
n.43 (1998).
272 See supra Section I.B.
273 See Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 THE
ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21, 32 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) 
(citing Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 389 
(2011)) (stating that, based on a 2008–09 survey, only ten states ensure representation within 
forty-eight hours of the initial bail hearing). 
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that the accused has virtually no avenues for recourse for unnecessary 
incarceration.274  
4. The Ineffectiveness of “Gap Filling”: A Negative Feedback Loop
The above analysis is a sampling of the errors and inaccuracies that
occur at each stage. Taken individually, each actor that Romero 
encountered may appear to be acting negligently, but their actions 
surely do not constitute malicious behavior. Romero’s circumstances 
demonstrate, however, that those harms should not be considered 
individually; instead, together the actors are responsible for creating a 
flawed process. Theoretically, each of these actors is supposed to be a 
check on the other: prosecutors assessing the evidence and accuracy of 
the arrest and courts neutrally weighing and analyzing the information 
presented to them. When each check is acting negligently, however, the 
compounding impact experienced by the accused is a result of more 
than mere negligence. Consequently, the most vulnerable members of 
society are pushed into a system that lacks critical checks that can 
prevent against erroneous deprivations of liberty or, to go one step 
further, against coerced convictions.  
This analysis is at odds with Schauer’s opinion that preventive 
measures such as pretrial detention do not pose any normative 
concerns.275 This level of layered inaccuracy built around a system of 
inequality is profoundly disturbing. Yet, this appears to be how most 
of our convictions originate.  
To think of the pretrial stage as something detached from case 
outcomes is a grave mistake. There is often a temptation to address 
pretrial reform by focusing on a singular issue that is ripe for reform, 
such as bad policing practices; however, the system is so beset with an 
interlocking web of problems that any singular fix will unfortunately 
fail to achieve a net effect. What is the best remedy when there is no 
identifiable “bad” actor? Are informal checks still feasible, or must the 
response be formalized?276  
When the entire system is to blame, the solution must therefore be 
of equal breadth. The following section addresses the benefits of a strict 
liability approach to pretrial compensation in comparison to other more 
informal checks.  
274 See supra Section II.B. 
275 See supra Section I.A. 
276 See Cole, supra note 2. 
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IV 
PRETRIAL COMPENSATION: A SOLUTION FOR THE LARGER CRIMINAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 
The following sections provide an overview of the formal and 
informal checks available at the pretrial stage, followed by an 
examination of existing reform policies and why such methodologies 
are inadequate when compared to strict liability-based pretrial 
compensation.  
A. Formal Versus Informal Checks
Pretrial detention was intended to be a small speck on the full 
trajectory of a criminal case.277 Due to the perceived dichotomy in 
interests, this becomes a technically challenging area of reform: How 
do we protect the rights of the legally innocent while also protecting 
the public? The Supreme Court’s answer is that pretrial detention is 
only temporary, so the harm is temporary.278 Although many are now 
understanding that the damage done (no matter how short the 
deprivation of liberty may be) is often permanent and irreversible, 
solutions continue to fall short.279  
The idea behind “informal” or “soft-law” checks is something akin 
to an honor system. Such checks assume good intentions and an interest 
in safeguarding the legitimacy of the greater system.280 That may work 
in some instances, where the majority sees itself as potentially affected 
by preventive justice measures.281 Here, in the pretrial detention 
scheme, society sees crime (and race) as an “us” versus “them” 
problem.282 Moreover, because the implementation of soft-law checks 
relies on the majority of self-interested actors—police officers, 
prosecutors, and judges—to fundamentally change the nature of their 
practices, it is likely a futile endeavor.  
As described above, unchecked preventive justice measures harm 
efforts to ensure accuracy in the justice system. Formal checks, such as 
legal rules specifically designed to deter overbroad preventive justice 
277 See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (affirming the 
Constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act); Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, tit. II, ch. 1, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (formerly S. 1762). 
278 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) (holding that twenty-four-hour liberty 
deprivations are permissible for the administration of justice). 
279 See supra Section I.C. 
280 See Cole, supra note 2, § IV. 
281 See id. 
282 Roberts, supra note 111, at 1021–22 n.243. 
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measures, can demand a change to existing practices. Although 
Schauer argued that all pretrial detention determinations risk 
inaccuracy due to the fact that nothing is based on pure certainty,283 
that should not justify turning a blind eye to inaccuracies that we know 
are caused by inherent inequalities.284 Through systemic reform, these 
are inaccuracies that can be checked.  
A combination of formal and informal checks exist to address some 
pretrial issues, particularly with regard to individuals charged with low-
level crimes.285 Unfortunately, such solutions are few and far between, 
creating two overarching issues: (1) because current reform efforts are 
occurring on a micro-level for low-level offenders, we overlook and 
exacerbate the problem for individuals charged with more serious 
crimes;286 and (2) as detailed in Displacing Due Process, a systemic 
front-end solution is critical, as flaws in the pretrial system have 
produced many macro-problems, including increasing carceral trends, 
destabilized communities, and inaccuracies in terms of case 
outcomes.287 The problem of unnecessary incarceration is not one 
isolated simply to “bail reform,” it is one that has ramifications 
affecting the disposition of many cases. Thus, we must think of reform 
in terms of its impact on the criminal legal system as a whole.  
B. The Risk of Reform
By better understanding the scope of preventive justice and how it 
has been applied in pretrial detention cases, we are able to identify both 
the surface-level problems that are created as well as the deeper 
systemic problems that lurk untouched in everyday criminal cases. It is 
an established fact that there are significant inequalities in the criminal 
legal system.288 This is not a new story; what is new is a solution that 
addresses it on the front end before it even becomes a problem.  
283 SCHAUER, supra note 59. 
284 See supra Section III.B.4. 
285 See infra Section IV.B. 
286 A significant amount of bail scholarship focuses on resolving systemic issues by 
focusing predominantly on misdemeanor offenses, and for good reason: misdemeanors 
make up the majority of cases in the criminal legal system. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 35. 
Additionally, misdemeanor crimes do not encompass much violence, and allegations of 
violence are much less politically palpable. As a result, reformers are less willing to focus 
on individuals charged with more serious crimes because those are more difficult to defend 
in the eyes of the public. See, e.g., Prudente, supra note 206. 
287 See Makar, supra note 33. 
288 See supra Section III.B. 
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The following sections address existing solutions that are arguably 
low risk and raise concerns about their viability to address the 
multilayered tiers of inequality discussed above. Such reform is less 
effective compared to the proposed solution of pretrial compensation. 
Counterarguments are addressed in turn to persuade readers about the 
effectiveness of such a proposal.  
1. Low-Risk, Low-Reward Reform
Advocates eager to identify solutions have proposed reforms that
would reduce the number of individuals incarcerated prior to trial.289 
Many of these reforms address surface-level problems, identify success 
by numbers, or tackle low-hanging fruit at the expense of individuals 
who face more serious charges.290 Let us briefly consider two reform 
policies that are currently being pursued in the pretrial context: (1) risk 
assessment tools and (2) nets of eligibility.291 
The use of risk assessment tools has been growing in popularity 
among states trying to reform their bail laws.292 Risk assessment tools 
are essentially a scoring sheet that assigns a value of low, medium, or 
high risk depending on specific background criteria that are indicative 
of a defendant’s failure to appear or, more commonly, recidivism.293 
These scores are intended to be guiding factors for judges to consider 
during a bail hearing.294 Risk assessment tools can be biased against 
those who rent rather than own a home, those who do not live with their 
biological families, and individuals with a prior arrest record but no 
convictions.295 Ultimately those with nontraditional living styles, 
289 See supra notes 4 and 13 and accompanying text. 
290 See supra notes 4 and 13 and accompanying text. 
291 For the purposes of this Article, I analyze risk assessment tools and nets of eligibility 
because those are the most commonly discussed reform vehicles today in the context of 
excessive preventive detention practices. Other methods of reform include community bail 
funds, which can be an effective way of nullifying an arbitrary money bail. See Jocelyn 
Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 585 (2017) (“[C]ommunity bail funds 
have the potential to change how local criminal justice systems operate on the ground, 
shifting and shaping political and constitutional understandings of the institution of money 
bail.”). 
292 Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 492–93 (2018) 
(providing detailed information on risk assessment tools). 
293 Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1131 (2018). 
294 George Joseph, Justice by Algorithm, CITYLAB (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.citylab. 
com/equity/2016/12/justice-by-algorithm/505514/ [https://perma.cc/Y8G6-GL7C]. 
295 This is intended to serve as an example of some of the ways in which risk assessment 
tools can lead to biased outcomes. Id. 
2020] Unnecessary Incarceration 659
which largely includes those in minority communities, are the most 
discriminated against by such tools.296  
The focus of these tools is to assess risk to the community and public 
safety.297 In some instances, where a judge is unsure if release is 
appropriate, a risk assessment tool could encourage the court to release 
the accused back to her community while she awaits trial.298 Release 
is the intent.299 As such, risk assessment tools were created with the 
intent to provide judges with a, theoretically, unbiased justification to 
make those hard decisions that may be unfavorable in the eyes of the 
larger community, particularly releasing an individual whose charges 
appear facially dangerous.300 
Yet the use and application of risk assessment tools widely differ.301 
This is demonstrated by the fact that judges ultimately have full 
discretion to make a ruling that is inconsistent with what the risk 
assessment calls for.302 As such, risk assessments tools have been met 
with resistance due to their potential for manipulation and their reliance 
on data that is already inherently biased.303 Since the data in the system 
are based on individuals who are both selectively arrested and 
296 There is a continuous effort by reformers to make risk assessment tools better. 
For instance, many are trying to rephrase risk of future dangerousness in terms of success 
for release. Laura and John Arnold Foundation Launches PSA to Improve Risk-Based 
Decision-Making, ARNOLD VENTURES (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.arnoldventures.org/ 
newsroom/laura-and-john-arnold-foundation-launches-psa-to-improve-risk-based-decision 
-making [https://perma.cc/A4C3-7QFG]. But see Sarah Desmarais et al., Risk Assessment
Tools Are Not a Failed ‘Minority Report,’ LAW 360 (July 19, 2019), https://www.law360.
com/access-to-justice/articles/1180373/risk-assessment-tools-are-not-a-failed-minority-
report- [https://perma.cc/5W8S-QDFM] (“While risk assessment tools may not eliminate
racial, ethnic or other biases, there is no evidence that they exacerbate them either.”).
297 Mayson, supra note 292. 
298 Chelsea Barabas et al., The Problems with Risk Assessment Tools, N.Y. TIMES (July 
17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/pretrial-ai.html [https://perma.cc/ 
M2AD-7APK] (“One judge explained his thinking to us. ‘You don’t want to be the judge 
that releases someone,’ he said . . . . This fear has led judges to systematically overestimate 
pretrial violence . . . . To fix this, jurisdictions across the country have embraced algorithmic 
risk assessments. The hope is that these tools can harness big data to help judges make more 
informed, accurate decisions, thereby reducing jail populations while maintaining public 
safety.”). 
299 See generally John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk 
Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725 (2018) (discussing the 
goal of reform efforts). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 294. 
303 BAUGHMAN, supra note 5. 
660 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 607 
prosecuted, bad outcomes provide the basis for the tools’ perceived 
reliability.304  
Ultimately, risk assessment tools are a numbers game. The tools 
look toward final case outcomes to validate the data used to make 
future determinations.305 Although reducing pretrial carceral 
populations is the end goal, these tools remove a layer of 
individualization that benefits only defendants charged with less 
serious crimes.306 Risk assessment tools will likely benefit individuals 
charged with misdemeanors and maybe a few low-level felonies with 
securing release because those individuals are facially perceived to be 
the least dangerous.307 But if the tool rates the accused as high risk, the 
defense attorney’s ability to advocate for release becomes a fruitless 
endeavor in the face of an algorithm.308 As such, through a blind 
acceptance of the numbers,309 risk assessment tools may benefit 
individuals charged with less serious crimes, while simultaneously 
eroding pretrial procedural protections that are especially needed for 
defendants facing more serious crimes.  
Nets of eligibility are another form of risk assessment, although, 
unlike risk assessment tools, they do not involve a formal 
computation.310 A net of eligibility is established by state rules or 
statutes that expressly permit the imposition of pretrial detention for 
304 See supra Section III.B; Barabas et al., supra note 298 (arguing that risk assessment 
tools provide a false form of validation when assessing the likelihood of future 
dangerousness). 
305 See supra Section III.B. 
306 See Barabas et al., supra note 298. 
307 See Roberts, supra note 35. 
308 Most states require courts to consider and weigh multiple factors when making a bail 
determination. The extensive list of factors indicates that courts should not rely solely on 
one factor, such as the charges or the results of a risk assessment tool, when making such a 
determination. See, e.g., ABA RULES ON PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS 10-1.1–10 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N). Each hearing is required to be an individualized review, and defense counsel 
plays an integral part in this by raising significant factors that weigh in favor of his client’s 
release. See generally Colbert et al., supra note 269. However, the fear is, the scientific 
effect of risk assessment tools effectively places blinders on the court whereby the court 
may fear to release someone simply because the tool indicates the accused is high risk. 
309 Cf. Mayson, supra note 3, at 2221–27 (arguing that pervasively disparate racial risk 
assessment outcomes made using risk assessment tools merely institutionalize the 
pervasively disparate racial risk assessments outcomes historically made by human decision 
makers in an apparently neutral medium because the risk assessment tools are partly based 
on historical metadata). 
310 See COHEN, supra note 26, at 2; COLIN DOYLE ET AL., HARVARD LAW SCH., 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL 
POLICY MAKERS 11 n.78 (2019), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/64N8-ZYAJ]. 
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certain charged offenses, the most typical being capital offenses.311 
This has the effect of prohibiting detention for individuals charged with 
low-level misdemeanors that pose little threat to public safety.312 For 
instance, Mississippi’s net of eligibility includes crimes punishable by 
life in prison or by twenty years or more if the accused has been 
previously convicted for a capital offense or committed a felony while 
on pretrial release.313 By contrast, Washington State’s net of eligibility 
is limited only to capital offenses.314 Though many of these statutes do 
offer case-by-case exceptions, the intent is that the use of preventive 
detention will be heavily restricted.315  
Logically, one would expect that if a limited number of crimes are 
eligible for pretrial detention, then pretrial incarceration levels will 
naturally diminish. That is not always the case because a net of 
eligibility creates a stronger emphasis on the charge itself, in turn 
making the prosecutor’s discretion to selectively prosecute and 
upcharge a crime more consequential.316 Such rules might also imply 
that, for all crimes included in the net of eligibility, anyone charged 
with a pretrial detention–eligible crime would effectively suffer from a 
presumption of detention based on the nature of the offense. Again, 
although nets of eligibility try to address the overall carceral numbers, 
individuals charged with certain crimes may be arbitrarily alienated. 
There is an obvious failure in this solution by allowing the discretion 
inherent in selective prosecution to continue to go unchecked.  
These solutions, although minimally effective, are likely to be 
implemented more broadly in the near future because they are low risk. 
Such solutions resolve issues that are low-hanging fruit in the justice 
system, and most can agree on the need for this type of reform.317 For 
example, I would be hard pressed to find someone who would disagree 
that the majority of nonviolent, low-level misdemeanants who face a 
sixty-day maximum penalty should ever be held without bail. Although 
judges are not formally prohibited from detaining community members 
charged with such misdemeanors, most judges now do not detain them. 
Instead, we are more likely to see such persons held on a monetary 
bond they cannot afford.  
311 Id. 
312 See Joseph, supra note 294. 
313 MISS. CONST. art. III, § 29. 
314 WASH. CT. R. 3.2(a). 
315 See COHEN, supra note 26, at 2; DOYLE ET AL., supra note 310, at 11 n.78. 
316 See supra Section III.B.2. 
317 See sources cited supra note 11. 
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Although these well-intentioned solutions provide some promise, 
they are only base-level solutions that provide imperfect fixes to 
smaller pretrial-specific issues. These solutions do not address the 
macro-level problems that trickle down after substantial inaccuracies 
have already manifested in a preventive detention scheme. 
2. High-Risk, High-Reward Reform
Compared to risk assessment tools and nets of eligibility, which can
be tacked on to the existing system, pretrial compensation is a high-risk 
reform proposal. Unlike these other types of reform that are more 
palatable, pretrial compensation would be a massive overhaul to the 
justice system and would potentially affect the diversion of funds to 
meet compensation standards, how officers make arrests, how 
prosecutors investigate and charge cases, and how judges enforce 
procedural protections.  
Let us now address the potential yield of reward as well as the 
perceived risks for a pretrial compensation proposal.  
a. Budget Allocation
When it comes to state budgets, politics usually beat logic.318 State
detention facilities often compete with educational funding; 
unfortunately, detention facilities usually come out on top.319 Our 
nation’s current pretrial detention scheme costs taxpayers 
approximately $13.6 billion a year.320 An empirical study conducted 
by Professor Shima Baradaran Baughman estimates that the “cost of 
[pretrial] detention exceeds the cost of release by approximately 
$20,000; detaining a defendant, on average, results in $40,300 in direct 
costs, while the average cost of releasing a defendant pretrial is just 
$19,500.”321  
318 See, e.g., INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 192. 
319 Mirko Bagarlic & Daniel McCord, Decarcerating America: The Opportunistic 
Overlap Between Theory and (Mainly State) Sentencing Practice as a Pathway to 
Meaningful Reform, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 237 (2019) (“This large expenditure on prisons 
necessarily means significantly less money that can be spent on productive social services, 
such as education and health.”). 
320 Bernadette Rabuy, Pretrial Detention Costs $13.6 Billion Each Year, PRISON POL. 
INITIATIVE (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/02/07/pretrial_cost/ 
[https://perma.cc/SM5L-V936]. 
321 Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 27 
(2017) (conducting an empirical study on the costs of pretrial detention or release to the 
detainee as well as the community, and concluding that a cost-benefit approach to release 
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Initially, in order to implement a pretrial compensation scheme, 
funding would need to be allocated.322 In order to be an effective 
deterrent against unnecessary incarceration, money supporting a 
pretrial compensation scheme could initially draw from existing police, 
prosecutor, court, and jail budgets.323 The idea is that by implementing 
a compensation scheme that affects their budgets, institutional players 
would be encouraged to engage in more conscious and fair decision-
making.324  
Eventually, this deterrent would be so effective that fewer and fewer 
individuals would be incarcerated unnecessarily.325 A reduction in 
pretrial detentions would provide cost savings realized by the justice 
system,326 which could then be spent on supporting community 
members through less onerous nonmonetary pretrial release 
services.327 It is not the case that a pretrial compensation scheme would 
eventually cost nothing.328 Instead, money spent on detention facilities 
would eventually be appropriated to nonmonetary pretrial release 
programs.329  
would yield approximately $78 billion in economic value saved through the detention of 
fewer individuals charged with violent crimes). 
322 The formulation would be similar to that of wrongful conviction budgets. 
323 A main critique of § 1983 litigation against police misconduct is that the money paid 
out to the victims does not come from the police officer’s budgets, diluting any potential 
deterrent value litigation has against those officers. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 
453 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1981) (“Punitive damages by definition are not intended to 
compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was 
intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct . . . . 
Regarding retribution, . . . an award of punitive damages against a municipality ‘punishes’ 
only the taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort . . . .”). 
324 See supra Part III. 
325 See supra Part III. 
326 SAWYER & WAGNER, supra note 34 (“Over 540,000 people are locked up who 
haven’t even been convicted or sentenced.”). 
327 Nonmonetary pretrial release services are typically defined as release programs that 
involve some level of supervision and support services for individuals while pending trial. 
E.g., DOYLE ET AL., supra note 310, at 29. This could include drug rehabilitation and testing,
electronic monitoring, in-home or phone check-ins, etc. See, e.g., id. at 37–38.
328 Some Scandinavian countries currently implement pay structures for those who 
suffer the consequences of unnecessary incarceration. These pay structures are based on a 
standard computation using a fixed monetary value for a single day incarcerated and 
multiplying it against the total days spent unnecessarily detained. See supra Part II. 
329 Many jurisdictions offer nonmonetary pretrial release programs. Guidance for 
Setting Release Conditions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/guidance-for-setting-release-
conditions.aspx [https://perma.cc/NWW2-APXK]. 
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The benefits of pretrial service programs outweigh the costs of the 
risks associated with releasing the accused.330 Jails that house pretrial 
detainees are different from prisons, which house those convicted of 
crimes for longer periods of time.331 Because of their temporary nature, 
fewer rehabilitative programs are offered to inmates in jails than are 
offered in prisons.332 Increasing the investment in pretrial release 
services may establish a more community-oriented focus on 
rehabilitation that would hopefully deter future criminal acts.333  
b. Arrest Practices and Data Collection
Citizens may be concerned that pretrial compensation would prevent
or deter officers from effectively regulating crime, but pretrial 
compensation should not have this effect. The idea is not to curb an 
officer’s ability to arrest someone but to encourage conscious and fair 
policing practices.  
The real bulk of the reform is intended to encourage more scrutiny 
by prosecutors and judges,334 not necessarily to deter officers from 
reporting crime. Because pretrial compensation is geared toward long-
term reform with an ultimate goal of enabling the justice system to 
produce more accurate results (less coercive case dispositions by way 
of plea deals), the idea is that policing agencies will follow their arrests 
and analyze resultant case dispositions in order to help gauge the 
accuracy of their policing efforts. This is something that neither risk 
assessment tools nor nets of eligibility would promote. Given how 
outcome-focused pretrial compensation practice would be, it would 
behoove police agencies to collect data on arrests and disposition 
outcomes.335  
330 See Baughman, supra note 321, at 19. 
331 Margo Schlanger, Differences Between Jails and Prisons, in PRISONS READING 
PART A 42, 42 (2003), https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Documents/ 
Resources/The_Difference_Between_Jails_and_Prisons%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5WF-
FYMH]. 
332 What Is the Difference Between Jail and Prison?, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/ 
legal-articles/what-is-the-difference-between-jail-and-prison-31513 [https://perma.cc/AYZ7- 
5M73] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
333 See, e.g., Mayson, supra note 292, at 546 n.251 (noting the complexity of quantifying 
a cost-benefit analysis to the incarcerated and his community); Jocelyn Simonson, Bail 
Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585 (2017) (arguing that community bail funds provide a 
community-based incentive to investment in individuals who enter the criminal justice 
system). 
334 See discussion supra Sections IV.B.2.C–D. 
335 This is assuming prosecutors do not engage in “dirty policing” practices. See sources 
cited supra note 237. 
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c. Prosecuting Practices
A question raised by this proposal might be whether prosecutors will
be held liable for bail recommendations that result in unnecessary 
incarceration or harm to the community. Increased forms of 
nonmonetary pretrial release should prevent the latter, but, of course, 
that cannot be guaranteed.336 As for the former, this proposal does not 
require that individual prosecutors be held directly liable (stripped of 
their absolute immunity) if they have acted negligently.337 As 
discussed above, at the bail stage, it is often difficult to find an 
explicitly malicious bad actor; instead, it is the system that generates 
inaccuracies, with each individual inaccuracy contributing to what, at 
first, appears to be a negligible role. As a result, this proposition does 
not seek to blame any one prosecutor directly, making the proposal 
slightly more politically palpable. 
Alternatively, some may question whether compensation would 
make prosecutors less willing to dismiss cases. In short, it should not. 
If anything, it may increase the speed with which prosecutors arrive at 
a case theory in order to assess the objective strength of the case.338 For 
example, if a prosecutor wants to detain someone prior to trial, the 
prosecutor would have to obtain a larger amount of evidence to 
properly secure detention for the accused. Due to limited time, 
prosecutors are generally unable to conduct an investigation on the 
front end, at least within the first twenty-four hours after arrest. In turn, 
prosecutors would have to be more judicious in selecting cases for 
pretrial detention. The prosecutor is also not limited from holding a 
pretrial detention hearing several days after the arrest or applying for a 
336 See discussion supra Sections IV.B.2.C–E. 
337 Many proposals offer larger frameworks to incentivize prosecutors to buy into the 
reform. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for 
Supervising Prosecutors: Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to 
Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 397 (2009) (arguing to 
expand the doctrine of command responsibility to incentivize supervising prosecutors to 
“develop a culture of ethical compliance within their organizations”). In an effort to ensure 
interest alignment by prosecutors, this proposal attempts to avoid immediate aversion by 
prosecutors but could go further to hold prosecutors directly accountable, in earlier stages 
of criminal proceedings. For the time being, it is hard to see how more direct reform would 
materialize given the lack of transparency in prosecutorial offices. See supra notes 253–55. 
This issue is much larger and better left for another article. 
338 Cf. Crespo, supra note 17, at 1354 (“[F]or the difficulty defendants typically face 
when pushing back against legal overreach is not finding a procedural device through which 
to mount their challenge but rather pinning the prosecutor to a specific legal theory of 
liability in the first place. Criminal charging instruments, after all, are much sparser than 
civil complaints, often alleging little more than the time and place of the offense.”). 
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new bail hearing in the future. Moreover, it does not mean that the 
accused would be released on his own recognizance—the accused will 
likely be held accountable through nonmonetary conditions. In sum, 
this may lead to a positive trend of increasing the number of dismissals 
at a faster rate if a prosecutor is better equipped (or incentivized) to 
assess the merits of each case in a timelier manner. 
In order to avoid false incentives, it should be cautioned that 
implementation of a pretrial compensation scheme should prohibit 
“dismissal-bargaining.” In other words, prosecutors must be prohibited 
from negotiating the dismissal of a case conditioned on the accused 
waiving his right to compensation. If not prohibited, dismissal-
bargaining may undo any of the deterrent effects of pretrial 
compensation as it may create a scheme in which prosecutors dismiss 
a case only if a defendant agrees he will not seek pretrial compensation 
for his time incarcerated.  
In the alternative, if he is incarcerated prior to trial, there is also the 
possibility that the accused may be incentivized not to accept a plea in 
the hopes that he will not be found guilty and receive compensation. 
The negative implication being that this could slow down the system 
as a whole. At this stage, however, the accused should have received 
or hired a defense attorney. The defense attorney will advise clients on 
the strength of the State’s case. With this in mind, the accused’s 
concern of obtaining a maximum penalty will likely outweigh the 
potential benefit of monetary compensation that could be provided.339 
d. Judicial Practices and Sufficiency of Procedural Protections
Judges preside over a large number of bail hearings daily.340 As
such, judges might wonder if pretrial compensation will lead to longer 
pretrial hearings or minitrials.341 In short, yes—that is what was 
envisioned when the Supreme Court held that pretrial detention was 
facially constitutional.342 But prosecutors should be less likely to seek 
339 See generally Russel D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-
Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1249 (2008) (“[T]he only types of disagreements 
that will result in rejection of a plea bargain are those in which the government estimates 
the value of a case as worth more . . . than the defendant.”). 
340 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 266 (discussing the number of bail hearings 
in Harris County, Texas, in 2016). 
341 This is not to imply that the rules of evidence would be applied here. 
342 In United States v. Salerno, the Court reviewed the district court’s record and noted 
that in addition to a detailed proffer, the Government presented wiretap evidence 
demonstrating “participat[ion] in wide-ranging conspiracies to aid their illegitimate 
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pretrial detention, so fewer cases will be brought before the court for 
preventive detention hearings. Thus, a judge should hear only cases that 
a prosecutor truly believes requires pretrial detention.  
By reducing the number of preventive detention cases brought 
before state courts, the accuracy issues raised by prospective 
procedural displacement would also be minimized.343 This is the idea 
that if courts have sufficient time and appreciate the risks associated 
with preventive detention, heightened procedural protections will be 
afforded to the accused. In sum, if pretrial detention is properly 
implemented and used sparingly, courts should not be overburdened. 
Relatedly, critics of pretrial compensation might not buy into the 
theory that society should simply accept the burden that befalls the 
accused when the justice system gets it “wrong.” There are many 
reasons a case may be dismissed prior to trial, and there are many 
reasons that a jury could acquit someone who is guilty. Critics of 
pretrial compensation may assert that the probable cause arrest standard 
lends its way to a certain level of culpability344—one that the accused 
brought upon himself. This is not a viable argument. The Supreme 
Court mandated a heightened standard of procedural protections in 
Salerno, and given what we know now about the compounding effect 
of inequality beginning with arrest, probable cause is simply not 
sufficient to detain the accused.345  
e. Overbreadth and Community Investment
Of course, there are instances that we cannot control, and the
criminal legal system is imperfect in more ways than its incarceration 
of arrestees prior to trial. It is also imperfect in terms of outcomes—
innocent individuals may take plea deals or be convicted at trial, and 
guilty individuals may have their charges dropped or be acquitted. 
These flaws will arise no matter what, but concerns regarding the 
overbreadth of a pretrial compensation scheme benefiting the 
potentially guilty should be limited for the following reasons.  
When an individual is incarcerated pursuant to an arrest, society 
theoretically receives a benefit of safety from the individual’s 
enterprises through violent means” as well as offering the testimony of two witnesses. 
481 U.S. 739, 743 (1987). In state court, this level of detail is not proffered. 
343 See generally Makar, supra note 33 (arguing that procedural due process protections 
are displaced at the pretrial stage with the anticipation that such protections will be provided 
at trial). 
344 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120–21 (1975). 
345 See supra Part III. 
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incarceration.346 Concerns of public safety drive in favor of pretrial 
detention. But to consider the benefits to public safety only in a 
situation where another member of society is arrested is a one-
dimensional, but fairly common, perspective.347  
Consider an individual who is released and later convicted. Perhaps 
the community feels the conviction is more just than not because the 
pressures of pretrial detention did not sway the accused from accepting 
a guilty plea. Ultimately, society feels vindicated and feels that the 
conviction is legitimate. A similar logic follows for someone who is 
released and not convicted.  
For individuals who are remanded and convicted, however, there is 
some uncertainty and unease in the validity of the outcome. This is 
because there is a potential that the conviction may have been secured 
through an illegitimate process if pretrial detention was used to 
leverage the accused into taking a plea.348 This may be less of a concern 
if the defendant is ultimately convicted through a trial;349 nonetheless, 
there is a significant disadvantage for the accused to assist his defense 
counsel during trial preparation if incarcerated.350 
Society assumes that it is receiving a significant benefit from guilty 
outcomes, not only in the form of public safety through pretrial 
detention but also validation that police officers are effective and that 
prosecutors are accurately ensuring justice is being done. In some cases 
this may be true, and in some cases it may not be.  
346 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51. 
347 See, e.g., id. at 751 (discussing that where the Government establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the accused presents a threat to the community, she may be 
detained prior to trial). Salerno does not discuss other factors that must be considered prior 
to determining that pretrial detention is permissible. 
348 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 273, at 22 (“No fewer than five empirical studies 
published in the last year, . . . have shown that pretrial detention causally increases a 
defendant’s chance of conviction . . . . The increase in convictions is primarily an increase 
in guilty pleas among defendants who otherwise would have had their charges dropped. The 
plea-inducing effect of detention undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system 
itself . . . .”). 
349 See Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects 
Case Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 515 (2018). Using web-scraped data to conduct 
a quasi-experiment, this study found that pretrial detention led to a 13% increase in the 
likelihood of being convicted of at least one charge. Id. at 511. This study noted that pretrial 
detention affects not only the accused’s ability to assist in mounting a defense but also 
affects the accused’s ability to attend rehabilitative courses, such as anger management, 
which might help prevent future detention. Id. at 515. 
350 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972) (“The time spent in jail is simply 
dead time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather 
evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.”). 
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In sum, every solution will have its consequences. Should our justice 
system not address unnecessary incarceration, the resultant negative 
feedback loop that such incarceration engenders will persist, rendering 
the criminal stages beyond pretrial hearings ineffective and inaccurate. 
CONCLUSION 
Preventive justice theory provides a lens to analyze the viability of 
pretrial detention practices in its current state. Although the criminal 
legal system’s main goal is to regulate crime and encourage 
rehabilitation, this long-term goal seems to be lost in favor of short-
term fixes to deter the overuse of pretrial detention, a result of 
procedural displacement practices. Pretrial detainees that either endure 
prolonged periods of incarceration and wait to be cleared of all charges 
or otherwise accept a guilty plea to escape wrongful detention suffer 
unjustifiably. 
Considering a pretrial compensation scheme as a remedy for 
unnecessarily incarcerated individuals allows us to compare the 
effectiveness of other reforms. It is clear that the problem goes much 
deeper than what many call “bail reform.” If meaningful reform is to 
happen in the name of increasing equality and accuracy in the criminal 
legal system, then larger-scale reform needs to occur to deter invidious 
practices at their root.  
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